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This Article examines the surprisingly under-explored relationship between habeas corpus and due
process, using ongoing detention at Guantanamo Bay as inroads into the broader topic. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Boumediene v. Bush held that the Constitution’s Suspension
Clause applies to detainees at Guantanamo, thus constitutionally protecting their filing of habeas
petitions. Since that decision, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has affirmed its preBoumediene conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not apply to Guantanamo detainees.
This unusual severing of the typically dual protections of habeas review and due process raises the
interesting question of how those two constitutional provisions relate. This Article sets out five
conceptions of the relationship between habeas and due process, then shows how each of those
conceptions connects to a particular reading of Boumediene. The Article concludes that, if and
when the issue of the applicability of due process to Guantanamo reaches the Supreme Court, the
Court’s conclusion may well come down to Justice Kennedy’s vote, which is likely to hinge on
whether he applies to the issue the same “impracticable and anomalous” test that he utilized when
writing the majority opinion in Boumediene or whether he approaches the issue from the
separation-of-powers perspective that he also emphasized in that decision. Which approach emerges
as dominant has implications beyond Guantanamo: it is likely to suggest a broader
understanding of the still-uncertain relationship between the Suspension and Due Process Clauses.
Hence, the Article reveals that while the opinion in Boumediene initially appears susceptible to
multiple, complementary readings, digging deeper so as to explore those readings’ implications for
the underlying issue of the relationship between habeas and due process reveals distinct tensions,
as the different readings of Boumediene suddenly begin to pull in different directions.

INTRODUCTION
In June 2008, one small piece of the Constitution traveled to
1
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court
held that the constitutional rights guaranteed under the Suspension
2
Clause applied extraterritorially to aliens held at Guantanamo. The
*

1
2
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Brill, Amy Chua, Travis Crum, Gene Fidell, Bob Geltzer, Linda Greenhouse, Albert Lichy,
Sam Rascoff, Steve Vladeck, Matt Waxman, and especially Jed Rubenfeld, whose encouragement and feedback helped me to formulate thoughts on this topic, to put them to
paper, and to revise and refine them. The author also thanks the editors of the Journal of
Constitutional Law for their exceedingly dedicated work on this Article.
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
As others have explained, a major aspect of the outcome in Boumediene was the Court’s
holding that there are affirmative rights guaranteed under the Suspension Clause. See
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Court’s opinion was decidedly narrow in multiple senses: Justice
Kennedy wrote on behalf of a five-to-four majority, and he made
every effort to confine his opinion just to Guantanamo and, crucially
for the discussion here, just to the Suspension Clause.
Since Boumediene, uncertainty has reigned as to whether that decision portended other parts of the Constitution accompanying the
Suspension Clause to Guantanamo, with the most likely next candi3
date being the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This Article
explains that, while the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held
both before and after Boumediene that the Due Process Clause does
not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, the logic of Boumediene itself
suggests that, eventually, the Supreme Court may reach a different
conclusion.
This Article does not reopen the debate over whether Boumediene
was decided rightly or wrongly. Nor does it make a normative argument about whether, in the abstract, the Due Process Clause should
apply to aliens detained at Guantanamo. Rather, the Article tackles
the narrow question of whether Boumediene is best understood to anticipate such a finding or whether its narrowness suggests that extraterritorial extension of the Suspension Clause to aliens was constitutionally unique. That inquiry demands broader consideration of a
surprisingly under-explored topic: the relationship between habeas
corpus rights and due process protections.
The Article begins by offering some background on Boumediene’s
holding and by suggesting what is at stake in considering whether
that holding anticipates a similar extension of the Due Process Clause
to Guantanamo.
Next, the Article summarizes relevant preBoumediene case law on due process at Guantanamo, after which the
discussion turns to relevant language of Boumediene itself. The Article
then explores the post-Boumediene case law on the applicability of due
process to Guantanamo detainees and surveys the scholarship on that
subject that has emerged in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision.
The next Part of the Article grapples with the relationship, in the
abstract, between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause,
offering five conceptions of how the two constitutional clauses relate
to each other. Finally, drawing on those different conceptions of the

3

Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Guantánamo: The Boumediene Decision,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16 (discussing Boumediene’s holding “that the Suspension Clause affirmatively confers a right to habeas corpus review”).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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habeas-due process relationship, the Article suggests five understandings of Boumediene, ranging from those pointing most strongly against
finding the Due Process Clause applicable to Guantanamo detainees
to those that point most strongly in favor of such a finding. In the
end, the Article concludes that the Supreme Court’s determination
may well come down to Justice Kennedy’s vote, which is likely to
hinge on whether he applies to the issue the same “impracticable and
anomalous” test that he utilized in Boumediene or whether he approaches the issue from the separation-of-powers perspective that he
also emphasized in that decision. Which approach emerges as dominant has implications beyond Guantanamo: it is likely to suggest a
broader understanding of the still-uncertain relationship between the
Suspension and Due Process Clauses. Hence, while the opinion in
Boumediene initially appears susceptible to multiple, complementary
readings, digging deeper so as to explore those readings’ implications
for the underlying issue of the relationship between habeas and due
process reveals distinct tensions, as the different readings of Boumediene suddenly begin to pull in different directions.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND THE STAKES
A. The Background: The Suspension Clause at Guantanamo
The Constitution’s Suspension Clause declares: “The privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
4
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”
5
While the meaning of those scant words remains much debated, the

4
5

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Compare Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion), with id. at 554
(Scalia, J., dissenting), and id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See generally Gerald L.
Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. 537, 539 (2010) (“Among other things, [the Suspension Clause] does not define the
content of the privilege or what amounts to a suspension, leaving them open to debate.”);
id. at 558 (“[T]he constitutional text did not express its purpose clearly.”); David L. Shapiro, Habeas Corpus, Suspension, and Detention: Another View, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 59, 59
(2006) (“The Suspension Clause . . . is as straightforward as an English sentence can be.
And to those familiar with the Great Writ, its meaning, at least at first reading, does not
seem obscure. Yet few clauses in the Constitution have proved so elusive.” (footnote
omitted)); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 607
(2009) (“We have come this far with much of the Clause’s meaning shrouded in mystery . . . .”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The New Habeas Revisionism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 941, 941
(2011) (reviewing PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE
(2010)) (noting the recent “unprecedented degree to which courts have had to grapple
with the purpose, meaning, and scope of the U.S. Constitution’s Suspension Clause” and
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basic idea of the writ of habeas corpus is that a prisoner has the right
to be brought before a judge in order to challenge the legality of the
prisoner’s detention (or, less typically, to challenge the conditions of
6
that detention). In turn, the Suspension Clause both affirms a prisoner’s right to challenge his detention and specifies that only in the
narrow instances of rebellion and invasion may the writ be suspended.
While habeas cases make their way to the Supreme Court with
some regularity, the Suspension Clause itself and the questions that it
raises about what habeas and suspension really mean have been the
7
focus of relatively few cases before the Court over the centuries. In
the 1807 case of Ex parte Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall suggested
that only Congress could constitutionally suspend the writ of habeas
8
corpus. In 1861, Chief Justice Taney, sitting as a federal circuit court
judge, invoked Bollman in holding that President Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus without congressional approval was unconstitu9
tional. Then, in the famous 1866 case of Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court found Congress’s suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus during the Civil War to have been lawful in general, but
deemed unconstitutional the use of military tribunals where civilian

6

7

8
9

the fact that “contemporary judges and scholars have found little settled by prior
precedent”).
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights,
and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2007) (“The mechanics of the writ’s
administration have changed little over the centuries. A representative of the detainee
petitions a court to issue a writ directing the prisoner’s custodian (the ‘respondent’) to
appear and to show lawful authority for the detention. If the court finds the detention
contrary to law, it can order the prisoner’s release.” (footnote omitted)); see also WILLIAM
F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 6 (1980) (“The writ operates
precisely as its English model: the writ is directed to a person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, to state
the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatever
the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf.”).
See Vladeck, supra note 5, at 963 (“[P]rior to 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court had consistently declined to give meaningful substantive content to the Suspension Clause. The
provision was seldom even mentioned in most of the Court’s significant nineteenthcentury habeas decisions, and even when it was invoked . . . the discussion was, charitably,
rather cursory. Even in cases traditionally thought of as significant habeas decisions, the
Suspension Clause received short shrift.” (footnotes omitted)).
Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93, 94 (1807).
Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149, 152 (1861) (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (Taney,
J). Note that some scholars contend that, in deciding Merryman, Chief Justice Taney was
acting not as a circuit judge but as Chief Justice in chambers. See, e.g., Special Event, The
Impeachment Trial of President Abraham Lincoln, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 351, 366–67 (1998) (showing the “testimony” of Professor Mark E. Neely, Jr. supporting this view in a mock impeachment trial of President Lincoln).
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10

courts were still operating. The Supreme Court’s most significant
twentieth-century war-time decision relating to the Suspension Clause
was 1948’s Hirota v. MacArthur, in which the Court rejected a Japanese
war criminal’s attempt to seek a writ of habeas corpus directly from
11
the Supreme Court based on its original jurisdiction. However, the
Supreme Court’s analysis of the Suspension Clause was unclear, as
the Court’s decision left vague which of two jurisdictional defects
12
proved fatal to the petitioner’s claims. Other significant twentiethcentury Supreme Court decisions implicating the Suspension Clause
consistently avoided grappling with foundational issues regarding the
13
meaning of the Clause itself.
While the Supreme Court’s Civil War-era decisions did invalidate
certain executive actions, the Court had never struck down a federal
statute on the basis of the Suspension Clause until the Court’s 2008
14
decision in Boumediene. Two previous Supreme Court decisions concerning Guantanamo, and two legislative responses by the political
15
branches, provided the backdrop for Boumediene.
In 2004, faced with habeas petitions from detainees held at Guantanamo, the Supreme Court held in Rasul v. Bush that federal courts
16
possessed jurisdiction over Guantanamo. Congress and President
Bush responded with the 2005 Detainee Treatment Act, which
stripped federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions from

10
11

12
13

14

15

16

Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866).
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948); see Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota:
Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497 (2007) (discussing recent implications of Hirota). Another World War II-era case that implicated the Suspension
Clause, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, was decided by the Court on statutory grounds, though
Justice Murphy’s concurrence reached the constitutional issue and invoked Milligan’s
understanding of suspension requirements. 327 U.S. 304, 328 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring).
See Vladeck, supra note 11, at 1518–22 (discussing the questions left unanswered in Hirota).
See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (denying habeas relief while avoiding core issues
surrounding the definition of the Suspension Clause); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372
(1977) (interpreting a statute to deny habeas relief while avoiding issues central to the
meaning of the Suspension Clause); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952) (ruling on a habeas petition without discussing the meaning of the Suspension Clause).
See Neuman, supra note 5, at 538 (“The Supreme Court had never before found a violation of the Suspension Clause, and the holding of Boumediene gives its reasoning a precedential significance that earlier discussions lack.”).
Also significant was INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001), in which the Supreme Court
looked to the Suspension Clause in deciding that Congress had not intended to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions from deportable aliens.
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470, 485 (2004).
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17

Guantanamo. A year later, the Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
that the Act did not apply to habeas petitions already pending on the
18
Yet again, Congress and President
date of the law’s enactment.
Bush rebuffed the Court, with the 2006 Military Commissions Act unambiguously stripping federal courts of jurisdiction over any habeas
19
petitions from Guantanamo, pending or otherwise.
The stage was set for the constitutional challenge that had been
avoided by the Supreme Court through its statutory decisions in Rasul
and Hamdan. Confronted once again by lower courts’ dismissal of
habeas petitions from Guantanamo, the Supreme Court faced squarely two questions in Boumediene: did the Guantanamo petitioners possess a constitutional right to habeas corpus, and, if so, did the Detainee Treatment Act provide an adequate and effective substitute in
the form of combatant status review tribunals (“CSRTs”)?
Writing for the Court’s five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy held
first that the petitioners did indeed possess such a right, and second
20
that the Act offered an inadequate substitute. The Court explained
that, because the right to habeas review had full effect at Guantanamo, Congress had to comply with the Suspension Clause in order to
suspend that right, yet Congress had neither enacted such a suspen21
sion nor provided an adequate substitute.
Hence, the Supreme
Court ordered lower courts to hear habeas petitions from detainees
at Guantanamo, even as Kennedy’s opinion explicitly left uncertain
22
the precise parameters of appropriate review.

17
18
19

20
21
22

Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 1405(e), 119 Stat. 3474, 3477
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006)).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 584 (2006).
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §§ 7(a), 7(b), 120 Stat. 2600,
2635, 2636 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Unlike the Detainee Treatment
Act, which stripped habeas jurisdiction specifically from Guantanamo detainees, see Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 § 1405(e) (“[N]o court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay . . . .”), the 2006 Military Commissions
Act applied everywhere, see Military Commissions Act of 2006, § 950j (“[N]o court, justice,
or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any claim or cause of action whatsoever . . . relating to the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission under this
chapter . . . .”).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008).
Id. at 771, 792.
Id. at 733 (“We do not address whether the President has authority to detain these petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and other questions regarding the
legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”); id.
at 798 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not address the content of the law that
governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to be determined. We hold that petitioners may invoke the fundamental procedural protections of habeas corpus.”); see Melt-
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After seven years of post-9/11 detentions at Guantanamo and two
previous Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Boumediene made
clear that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause applied to noncitizens held at Guantanamo: “We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
23
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” What the decision
meant for the rest of the Constitution’s applicability to Guantanamo
24
remained an open question.
B. The Stakes: The Due Process Clause at Guantanamo
One could ask many questions about the implications of Boumediene for the rest of the Constitution’s applicability to Guantanamo—
indeed, as many questions as there are other relevant guarantees con25
tained in America’s founding document. But one such question is
particularly pressing: does Boumediene’s application of the Suspension
Clause to Guantanamo portend the similar application there of the
26
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?

23
24

25

26

zer, supra note 2, at 3 (noting that Boumediene raised “a broad range of questions, left to
the future, about how the habeas jurisdiction will operate”).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
See Usman Ahmed, Prosecuting Torture Through the Lens of Boumediene 3 (Sept. 29,
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684405 (arguing “that other constitutional provisions
can pass the Boumediene test and should be extended to alien-detainees in the same way as
habeas”). The question of whether other constitutional rights applied to Guantanamo
detainees had emerged even before Boumediene. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at
2093 (“Another looming question at the time of the Hamdan decision involved the procedural rights, if any, that Guantánamo detainees possess under the Due Process
Clause.”); id. at 2094 (“[T]he question [then] becomes whether an alien seized abroad
acquires procedural due process rights as a result of being relocated to Guantánamo
Bay.”).
See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2108 (2009) (asking, in the wake of Boumediene, “do
other constitutional provisions ‘ha[ve] full effect’ at Guantanamo?” (quoting Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 771)). One could also ask an important set of questions about the extraterritorial reach of the Suspension Clause beyond Guantanamo in the wake of Boumediene, but
that is not this Article’s topic. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing the reach of the Suspension Clause); see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 261 (2009) (exploring questions raised in the wake of the “functional approach” adopted in Boumediene). Maqaleh, in
particular, raises the question of whether Boumediene is, in fact, geographically limited in
its scope as suggested above, or whether its functional approach is decidedly unlimited, as
the Maqaleh petitioners argue and as the district court initially found. See Al Maqaleh v.
Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (D.D.C. 2009).
Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1838402
(“Boumediene, . . . though not about the Due Process Clause, likely recalibrates the Court’s
approach to whether all individual constitutional rights apply extraterritorially, including
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The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause guarantees to individuals certain protections against the federal government: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
27
process of law . . . .” Because there exists a number of significant
ways—explored below—in which the possible applicability of the
28
Clause to Guantanamo detainees affects ongoing litigation, the Due
Process Clause appears to be the part of the Constitution whose potential to accompany the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo will confront the Supreme Court soonest. In other words, the stakes already
loom large.
First, the D.C. District Court and Court of Appeals have followed
Boumediene’s mandate to hear and decide habeas petitions from
29
Guantanamo. Indeed, much as Boumediene anticipated, the lower
courts appear to have worked out at least some standards on which to
30
decide such cases, even if significant uncertainty remains. Among

27
28

29

30

whether the Guantanámo detainees are entitled to due process protections.”); see Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al-Madhwani v. Obama, No. 11-7020 (U.S. Oct. 24, 2011),
available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/al-Madhwani.pdf
(petitioning the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether the Court of Appeals’ denial of due
process protections to Guantánamo Bay detainees is inconsistent with the law and the
Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush”).
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 309 (1993) (“Due process doctrine subsists
in confusion. The disarray partly reflects the terrain that due process covers.” (footnote
omitted)).
Ironically, the literal meaning of habeas corpus—“may you have the body,” or “you
should have the body”—has not applied to post-Boumediene habeas proceedings concerning Guantanamo: no “body” has actually been brought from Guantanamo into court,
though some petitioners have participated in the proceedings via teleconference. (On
the literal meaning, see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 n.10 (1950).) I appreciate
Sophie Brill bringing this linguistic irony to my attention.
Cf. Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Decisions Detained: The Courts’ Embrace of Complexity in Guantánamo-Related Litigation, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 94, 124 (2011) (“Hence, virtually the entire string of major Guantánamo-related cases has traveled from the D.C. District Court to
the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court, only to return to the district court with unanswered questions whose resolution by district court judges is inevitably challenged first before the D.C. Circuit and again before the Supreme Court.”). Compare HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST, HABEAS WORKS: FEDERAL COURTS’ PROVEN CAPACITY TO HANDLE GUANTÁNAMO
CASES 1 (2010), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/Habeas-Works-finalweb.pdf (“Habeas is working. The judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia have ably responded to the Supreme Court’s call to review the detention of individuals at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.”), with BENJAMIN WITTES, ROBERT CHESNEY & RABEA
BENHALIM, THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS
LAWMAKING 3 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/
2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf
(“So
fundamentally do the judges disagree on the basic design elements of American detention law that their differences are almost certainly affecting the bottom-line outcomes in
at least some instances.”).
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those standards appears to be an emerging consensus that statements
elicited through coercive interrogation should not be admitted in assessing habeas petitions.
In the process of evaluating habeas petitioners’ arguments for
suppressing statements alleged to be coerced, the D.C. District Court
has underscored one potential impact of the applicability of the Due
31
Process Clause to Guantanamo. For example, in Al-Qurashi v. Obama, Judge Huvelle invoked the two logics for suppressing coerced
statements commonly identified in the case law on voluntariness:
first, that basic fairness does not permit admission of the fruits of
coercion; and second, that involuntary confessions have questionable
32
reliability. In discussing the first concept, Judge Huvelle seemed
implicitly to be relying on the protections associated with due
33
process, citing a number of Supreme Court cases on the subject. At
the same time, Judge Huvelle’s acknowledgment that a due processbased approach was in tension with certain D.C. Circuit dicta suggested that such constitutional grounds might, on their own, be in34
sufficient to justify suppression. Similarly, in deciding to suppress
coerced statements in the course of assessing a Guantanamo detainee’s habeas petition, Judge Kessler’s opinion in Mohammed v. Obama
emphasized the same dual foundations for requiring voluntariness of
35
statements.
In both cases, the invocation of the Due Process Clause’s requirement that coerced statements be suppressed suggests one potential consequence of that Clause’s extension to Guantanamo: if

31

32

33

34
35

See generally WITTES, CHESNEY & BENHALIM, supra note 30, at 51–60 (discussing the approaches of judges on the D.C. District Court to involuntary statements in the context of
habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees).
Al-Qurashi v. Obama, 733 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 n.14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“It is also well established that in criminal proceedings, statements of the accused ‘that are extracted by
threats or violence violate the Due Process Clause’ because such statements are ‘inconsistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Karake, 443 F. Supp. 2d 8,
50–51 (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Al-Qurashi, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (citing, among other Supreme Court precedent on the
required suppression of coerced statements, Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); and Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)).
Al-Qurashi, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.14.
Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In the criminal context,
confessions or testimony procured by torture are excluded under the Due Process Clause
because such admissions would run contrary to ‘fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’ Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936). Also, as a practical matter, resort to coercive tactics by an interrogator renders the information less likely to be true. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,
638 (1965).” (footnote omitted)).
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Guantanamo detainees are entitled to due process protections, then
the suppression of coerced statements by district courts evaluating
habeas petitions from Guantanamo would flow directly from the Supreme Court’s constitutional precedent, rather than remaining subject to an evidentiary balancing test involving a mix of semi36
constitutional protections and pragmatic concerns about reliability.
(Whether Supreme Court precedent in this area itself constitutes essentially a balancing test is another matter.) Of course, suppression
of coerced statements is just one of many possible ways in which the
applicability of due process could affect courts’ continuing evaluations of habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees: others
37
might include the standard of proof, the ability to present and to

36

37

By way of contrast, it is worth noting that, in the trial in the Southern District of New York
of Ahmed Ghailani, the applicability of the Due Process Clause’s prohibition on coerced
statements does not seem to have been disputed, presumably because the location of
Ghailani’s trial—namely, on American soil—resolved the issue. That seems to have been
the case even though the conduct at issue—Ghailani’s interrogation by American investigators—indisputably occurred abroad. See United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261,
264 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“The government has elected not to litigate the details of what was
done to the defendant. Instead, it has asked the Court to assume for the purposes of the
motion that everything the defendant said was coerced in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, this decision, at the government’s behest, proceeds on that premise.”). For an interesting discussion of the suppression of coerced statements in military
commission proceedings at Guantanamo, see David J.R. Frakt, Mohammed Jawad and the
Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367, 1390–96 (2011).
Cf. Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (declining to decide whether
the Suspension Clause requires use of a preponderance of the evidence standard in reviewing habeas petitions); Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(“[Boumediene] left open . . . the standard of proof the Government must meet in order to
defeat a petition for habeas corpus.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al-Odah v. United States, No. 10-439 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Al-Odah-cert-petition-9-28-10.pdf (petitioning the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather
than a clear and convincing evidence standard, is sufficient under the Due Process Clause
of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to support a ruling in favor of indefinite imprisonment, potentially for life,” at Guantanamo), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011). Note
that the Al-Odah petitioners appeared to take for granted that the Due Process Clause applies to them, despite the contrary holding of the D.C. Circuit. In contrast, see Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, Awad v. Obama, No. 10-736 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Awad-petition-11-30-10.
pdf (challenging the preponderance of the evidence standard based on Boumediene alone,
without invoking the Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). Regarding
the overall significance of standard-of-proof issues in Guantanamo habeas litigation, see
generally Matthew C. Waxman, Guantánamo, Habeas, and Standards of Proof: Viewing the
Law Through Multiple Lenses, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 245, 246–56 (2009). Waxman’s
analysis suggests that a determination of the applicability of due process to Guantanamo
detainees would not in itself decide the appropriate standard of proof, see id. at 250–51;
nonetheless, such a determination still could play an important role as one factor in-
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38

exclude various types of evidence, and the right to cross-examine
witnesses. Indeed, to the extent that the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause is thought to offer the same protections against the
federal government offered against the state governments by the
39
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, finding the Due
Process Clause applicable to Guantanamo would essentially carry with
it the rest of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights.
More specifically, a second consequence of the potential applicability of the Due Process Clause to Guantanamo would be the narrowing of the executive branch’s discretion in resettling detainees
cleared for release. Indeed, as will be discussed below, the D.C. Circuit’s post-Boumediene statement of the inapplicability of due process
to Guantanamo emerged in precisely this context, as Uighur detainees long cleared for release but lacking a viable destination for re40
settlement sought entry to the United States. Other detainees also
have objected to the destinations in which the United States has in41
tended to resettle them. If due process were found applicable to

38

39

40

41

fluencing the standard deemed appropriate. For a thorough assessment of the D.C. Circuit’s approach to this issue, see Vladeck, supra note 26, at 12–17.
Cf. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Awad v. Obama, No. 10-736 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010),
available
at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Awadpetition-11-30-10.pdf (challenging the admission of hearsay in habeas proceedings
brought by Guantanamo detainees), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 3, Al-Odah v. United States, No. 10-349 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Al-Odah-cert-petition-928-10.pdf (petitioning the Supreme Court to halt “the indiscriminate admission of hearsay” by the lower courts in habeas proceedings brought by Guantanamo detainees), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011). Neither petition for certiorari invoked the Due Process
Clause on this point, but a finding of due process’s applicability to Guantanamo surely
would have bolstered their shared argument.
But see Sanford v. United States, 586 F.3d 28, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that, despite
the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment jury right via the Fourteenth Amendment,
“[t]he right to jury trial is not, however, converted into a procedural due process right by
incorporation,” meaning that the content of the right as incorporated against the states is
not necessarily applicable in identical fashion against the federal government).
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated by Kiyemba v. Obama,
559 U.S. at 1 (2010), reinstated by Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1047 (D.C. Cir.
2010). For a helpful overview of the Kiyemba litigation, see Vladeck, supra note 5, at 971–
76.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia at i, Khadr v. Obama, No. 10-751 (U.S. Dec. 2, 2010) (petitioning the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether, in a habeas corpus action brought by an individual
held in United States territory, including Guantánamo, . . . Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008), the Suspension Clause, and the Due Process Clause permit[] the district
court to give conclusive effect to the government’s assertion that the individual is unlikely
to be tortured if transferred to a particular country”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2900 (2011);
see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia at i, Mohammed v. Obama, No. 10-746 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2010) (petitioning
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such individuals, then their constitutional claims to entry onto American soil, or at least to a voice in their eventual destination, would be
strengthened greatly. Moreover, the absence of due process rights
also contributed to the D.C. Circuit’s subsequent holding that the decision of where to resettle the Uighurs was immune from judicial
challenge by the detainees and, instead, remained at the discretion of
42
the political branches. If due process were to apply to Guantanamo
detainees, then their claim to a legally protected voice in their own
resettlement would be significantly enhanced. Even short of that result, the applicability of due process could suggest a temporal limit
43
on how long such detainees could be held once cleared for release.
Third, former Guantanamo detainees have begun filing civil lawsuits seeking compensation from the U.S. government for their alleged treatment while detained at Guantanamo. For example, one
representative case filed in the Western District of Washington alleges
torture and abuse, and identifies as the basis for its cause of action al44
leged violations of the Due Process Clause. These civil suits are socalled Bivens actions in that they allege constitutional violations by
federal agents, allegations permitted to go forward by the Supreme
45
Court’s decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. A Bivens ac-

42
43

44

45

the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether, in a habeas corpus action brought by an individual held in United States territory, including Guantánamo, . . . Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723 (2008), the Suspension Clause, and the Due Process Clause permit[] the district
court to give conclusive effect to the government’s assertion that the individual is unlikely
to be tortured if transferred to a particular country”); id. at 16 (“Review is also warranted
to establish definitively that Guantánamo detainees have a due process right to challenge
their transfers to another country on the ground that they are likely to be tortured
there. . . . Due process . . . does not permit the Government to transfer a Guantánamo detainee to feared torture without affording him a meaningful opportunity to challenge his
transfer on that ground.”). Note that, like the Al-Odah petitioners mentioned above, Mohammed and the Khadr petitioners appeared to take for granted that the Due Process
Clause applies to them, despite the contrary holding of the D.C. Circuit.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699, 701 (2001) (holding, in the immigration context,
that six months constitute a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” for determining whether a deportable alien’s “removal is not reasonably foreseeable”).
See Complaint and Jury Demand at 35, Hamad v. Gates, No. 2:10-cv-00591-MJP (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 7, 2010) (“The acts described herein constitute violations of the life and liberty interests of Mr. Hamad in violation of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which prohibits cruel and inhuman treatment constituting punishment.”). The
district court dismissed Hamad’s suit, with leave to amend, based on immunity grounds.
See Order Granting Defendants’ Motions To Dismiss, Hamad v. Gates, No. 2:10-cv-00591MJP (W.D. Wash. Dec. 8, 2011). Note that the Hamad court did not find the Military
Commissions Act to pose an obstacle to such suits, id. at 3–6, in contrast to a decision
handed down two weeks later by the D.C. District Court, see Memorandum Opinion at 11–
15, Al Janko v. Gates, No. 1:10-cv-01702-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2011).
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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tion is only as credible as the constitutional right that it alleges to
have been violated; in other words, if the former detainees possessed
no due process rights at Guantanamo, then they may have no viable
46
Bivens actions, either. While there are numerous other potential
obstacles to the detainees prevailing in their suits, including pleading
47
48
requirements, immunity claims, and potential invocations of state
49
secrets, if there is no fundamental due process protection at Guantanamo, then the suits may lack even rudimentary foundations. In
contrast, if due process does apply, then litigation is more likely to
move forward, even if the aforementioned obstacles eventually become significant hurdles to plaintiffs prevailing on the merits.
Fourth, the applicability of due process to Guantanamo could alter dramatically the military commissions that continue to be held
there. Because military commissions and courts-martial are not Article III trials but, instead, constitute Article I proceedings, the protections of the Bill of Rights, including the Fifth Amendment, do not
automatically apply to them. In 1994, the Supreme Court noted the
President’s authority to regulate military proceedings and explained:
“We have never had occasion to consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, or the attendant right to
counsel during custodial interrogation, applies of its own force to the
50
military, and we need not do so here.”
The same uncertainty about the applicability of constitutional
51
protections to military proceedings persists more broadly. To be
46
47

48

49

50
51

See Ahmed, supra note 24, at 3 (arguing that the application of due process protections to
Guantanamo detainees would give rise to Bivens actions).
Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (dismissing for insufficiently meeting pleading standards a Bivens action against former high-ranking officials alleging mistreatment
during detention).
Cf. id. at 1947 (discussing qualified immunity as a defense against a Bivens action against
former high-ranking officials alleging mistreatment during detention); Rasul v. Myers,
563 F.3d 527, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (accepting a qualified immunity defense to claims
made by former Guantanamo detainees), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Ahmed, supra note 24, at 3 (noting that “a damages action would lend itself to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity”).
Cf. Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 54 n.26, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, No. 1:10-cv1469-JDB (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 2010) (invoking the state secrets privilege against Fifth
Amendment claims).
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 n.1 (1994).
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 777 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning whether the Eighth Amendment applies to courts-martial); Weiss v. United States,
510 U.S. 163 (1994) (finding the Due Process Clause applicable to courts-martial but in
adapted form); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (finding the Sixth Amendment
inapplicable to courts-martial and finding Fifth Amendment due process applicable, but,
in the context of summary courts-martial, finding it not to provide a right to counsel);
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sure, the current rules for military commissions, enacted by Congress
and the President precisely to try current detainees at Guantanamo,
depart significantly from constitutional guarantees, perhaps most
52
notably in the admissibility of hearsay. If the Due Process Clause
were deemed applicable to Guantanamo, then military commissions
might well have to conform to safeguards protected in civilian trials
in ways that the commissions currently do not. Moreover, just as due
process would require suppression of coerced statements in habeas
petitions in civilian court, so, too, might due process require suppression of those statements in military commissions, in contrast to the
ruling of at least one military commission admitting such state53
ments. In light of the Obama Administration’s announcement that,
after congressional urging, military commissions will recommence at
54
Guantanamo, the potential consequences of finding due process
applicable to those proceedings are particularly salient and significant.
Other effects on ongoing litigation of an extension of due process
rights to Guantanamo are conceivable. Moreover, extending due
process to Guantanamo could have an impact outside of courtrooms:
the daily treatment of detainees might well have to change, with po55
tentially freer access to counsel and to outside information, as well
as the provision of other measures generally afforded to those held in
pre-trial detention on American soil. Simply put, deriving from Boumediene an understanding of whether the Due Process Clause accompanies the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo is not just a fascinating
question of constitutional law: it is also a pressing issue for which the
56
legal and practical stakes are sizable.

52

53

54
55

56

Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (finding the First Amendment applicable to the military but in adapted form).
See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 949a(b)(3)(d), 123 Stat. 2190,
2582–83 (2009) (permitting in military commission proceedings certain uses of hearsay
“not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general
courts-martial”).
See United States v. Khadr, D-094, D-111 (Guantanamo Military Commission Aug. 17,
2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/D94-D111.pdf (denying the defense’s
motion to suppress statements made by the then-teenage accused after interrogators
threatened him with indefinite detention and rape).
See Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, in Reversal, Clears Way for Guantanamo Trials To
Resume, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2011, at A19.
See generally David Cole, What To Do About Guantanamo?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 14, 2010,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/oct/14/what-do-aboutguantanamo/ (discussing Guantanamo detainees’ restrictions on access to counsel and
outside information).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, 20, Al-Madhwani v. Obama, No. 11-7020 (U.S. Oct.
24, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/al-
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This Article’s analysis treats the Due Process Clause much as the
Supreme Court treated the Suspension Clause in Boumediene: as a binary on/off switch. That is, even as the Supreme Court acknowledged that “the Suspension Clause does not resist innovation in the
57
field of habeas corpus,” the Court’s bottom-line holding was that the
Suspension Clause was fundamentally “on” for detainees at Guantanamo: as quoted above, the Court held “that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
58
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay.” Even more so than
habeas relief, due process cannot be reduced to a binary on-or-off:
due process is a flexible guarantee, as the type of process that is due
differs in different circumstances—a fact that the Court recognized in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld as it found due process applicable to wartime detention but then asserted that “the exigencies of the circumstances
may demand that, aside from . . . core elements, enemy-combatant
proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to
59
burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”
Hence, nothing in this Article should be taken to suggest that due
process, if applicable to Guantanamo, must assume any particular, ri60
gidly predetermined form. But a threshold question is whether the
61
Due Process Clause applies to Guantanamo at all, just as Boumediene

57
58
59

60

61

Madhwani.pdf (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s denial of due process protections to Guantanamo detainees “profoundly and fundamentally affects all of its analyses” and that
“[t]he lower courts badly need guidance on the question of the application and scope of
due process entitlements of Guantánamo detainees”).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795 (2008).
Id. at 771.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 538 (“[A]
court that receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself ensure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved.”).
One might, for example, distinguish between defensive invocations of due process, such
as detainees’ arguments against the admissibility of coerced statements during habeas
proceedings, see supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text, and affirmative invocations of
due process, such as the Kiyemba petitioners’ argument for a right to be released on U.S.
soil, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text. If courts were to find the Due Process
Clause applicable to Guantanamo, they still might find more compelling detainees’ negative invocations of due process than their positive invocations. Thanks to Steve Vladeck
for underscoring this distinction.
Especially in light of the incremental approach adopted in the Supreme Court’s Guantanamo-related decisions thus far, it is conceivable that, if due process is understood as a
property law-like “bundle of sticks,” then the Supreme Court might decide the applicability to Guantanamo of only one “stick” at a time. If so, then the full impact of how the Supreme Court decides the threshold question addressed here—whether due process applies to Guantanamo at all—might not become clear for quite some time. Thanks to Matt
Waxman for noting this idea. It is also conceivable that, as a legal realist would be particularly keen to suggest, a court addressing this threshold issue might reason backward
from potential implications: that is, a court first would ask what rights must flow if due
process were found applicable to Guantanamo, and what rights could flow, especially in
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addressed the threshold question of whether the Suspension Clause
applied there in any way. And it is that question on which this Article
focuses.
II. PRE-BOUMEDIENE CASE LAW
In an earlier era, the issue of whether the Due Process Clause applies to aliens detained at Guantanamo would have been resolved
quickly by any court confronted with it: case law preceding Boumediene suggested that aliens at Guantanamo would be classified as noncitizens located abroad and, in turn, would not receive due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. In 1936, the Supreme Court
stated bluntly: “Neither the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any force in foreign territory unless in respect of our
62
own citizens.” With Guantanamo presumed to qualify as “foreign
territory,” aliens detained there would not have received Fifth
Amendment protections.
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v. Eisentrager, rejecting a lower court’s view that the Fifth Amendment applied to aliens
detained in Germany: “The Court of Appeals has cited no authority
whatever for holding that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon
all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and
whatever their offenses, except to quote extensively from a dissenting
opinion in In re Yamashita. The holding of the Court in that case is,
63
of course, to the contrary.” The Supreme Court thus adopted an
opposite view from that espoused by the lower court, finding Fifth
Amendment protections inapplicable to the alien detainees being
64
held abroad.
Forty years later, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to an alien lo65
cated abroad.
Writing for a five-Justice majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist thought “it significant to note that [the Fourth Amend-

62
63
64

65

the hands of future courts, and, based on consideration of those consequences, decide
the threshold issue. Thanks to Travis Crum for this point.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (discussing In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
26 (1946)).
See id. at 784–85. Stephen Vladeck has called into question whether Eisentrager in fact
found the Fifth Amendment inapplicable to the petitioners, arguing instead that the
Court accepted the absence of statutory habeas jurisdiction only because it found that the
petitioners’ substantive claims lacked merit. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent, 44 TULSA L. REV. 587, 595–600 (2009). As Vladeck acknowledges, the
Supreme Court has adopted a more expansive understanding of Eisentrager. See id. at 600.
494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
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ment] operates in a different manner than the Fifth Amendment,
66
which is not at issue in this case.” Nonetheless, in what presumably
qualified as dicta, the Court cited Eisentrager in characterizing its
precedent thus: “[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of
67
the United States.”
Significantly, Justice Kennedy concurred in Verdugo to explain his
decisive fifth vote. His explanation was context-specific: “The conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and ano68
malous.” Justice Kennedy appeared to suggest that constitutional
protections should be presumed to apply to aliens abroad unless their
application is, in the particular context at issue, “impracticable and
anomalous.” That key phrase emerged from the concurrence written
by Justice Harlan in the 1957 case of Reid v. Covert, in which Justice
Harlan declared that, for American citizens located abroad, constitutional protections might not apply if the context made their applica69
tion “impracticable and anomalous.”
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Verdugo suggested that, in his view, this same test could and
should apply to non-citizens abroad, too.
Subsequent lower court decisions concerning aliens at Guantanamo picked up on this test. In 1992, the Second Circuit applied the
“impracticable and anomalous” test in finding that the Fifth Amend70
ment extended to aliens at Guantanamo. The Second Circuit’s decision was, however, reversed by the Supreme Court, whose opinion
in Sale v. Haitian Centers Council made no mention of due process, in71
stead resolving the case on other grounds.
A few years later, the Eleventh Circuit also faced the question of
whether the Fifth Amendment applied to aliens at Guantanamo.
Taking an opposite view of that articulated by the Second Circuit, the
Eleventh Circuit declared that, at Guantanamo, “the Cuban and Haitian migrants have no First Amendment or Fifth Amendment rights
72
which they can assert.”
The D.C. Circuit reached a roughly similar conclusion in its decision in 2000 in Harbury v. Deutch. There, the court declined to find

66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Id. at 264.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1343 (2d Cir. 1992).
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1428 (11th Cir. 1995).
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an alien in Guatemala to be entitled to Fifth Amendment protections:
“[A]liens abroad may be entitled to certain constitutional protections
against mistreatment by the U.S. Government . . . . But [in Verdugo]
the Supreme Court’s extended and approving citation of Eisentrager
suggests that its conclusions regarding extraterritorial application of
the Fifth Amendment are not so limited [to enemy aliens during war73
time].”
In turn, the court rejected Harbury’s invocation of due
process rights—but Guatemala, of course, is not Guantanamo, and
the basis for claiming that constitutional rights are applicable in
Guantanamo seems greater given America’s unique exercise of control there.
As the United States began detaining suspected terrorists at Guantanamo as part of its campaign against al-Qaeda, courts again faced
invocations of Fifth Amendment protections by aliens located there.
In 2003, the D.C. Circuit repeated that it did not view the Due
Process Clause as extending to aliens at Guantanamo. In Al Odah v.
United States, the court concluded: “If the Constitution does not entitle the detainees to due process, and it does not, they cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of our courts to test the constitutionality or the legali74
ty of restraints on their liberty.” The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Al
Odah was subsequently reversed on other grounds by the Supreme
75
Court in Rasul v. Bush.
After Rasul, one D.C. district judge held in January 2005 that the
Fifth Amendment did not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, explaining that “our Circuit Court has repeatedly held that a ‘foreign entity
without property or presence in this country has no constitutional
76
rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.’” That decision
77
was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in its decision in Boumediene, which
78
itself was reversed by the Supreme Court.
Also in January 2005, another D.C. district judge reached the opposite conclusion regarding Guantanamo, finding that “the detainees

73
74

75
76
77
78

Harbury v. Deutch, 233 F.3d 596, 603–04 (D.C. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002).
Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added); see also
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Al Odah for the “conclu[sion]
that detainees were not entitled to due process”), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (remanding “for further consideration in light of Boumediene v. Bush”).
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (D.D.C. 2005) (citations omitted).
476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
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79

have fundamental rights to due process.” The court applied Justice
Kennedy’s “impracticable and anomalous” test and reached the same
conclusion regarding Guantanamo that the Second Circuit had
reached in 1992: “There would be nothing impracticable and anomalous in recognizing that the detainees at Guantanamo Bay have
the fundamental right to due process of law under the Fifth Amend80
ment.” In turn, “the Court recognizes the detainees’ rights under
81
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.” This decision al82
so was vacated by the D.C. Circuit in Boumediene.
In Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit found no Fifth Amendment rights
applicable to detainees at Guantanamo. The court acknowledged Rasul but rested its holding on Verdugo and Eisentrager: “The detainees
cannot rest on due process under the Fifth Amendment. . . . Although in Rasul the Court cast doubt on the continuing
vitality of Eisentrager, absent an explicit statement by the Court that it
intended to overrule Eisentrager’s constitutional holding, that holding
83
is binding on this court.”
The Supreme Court then reversed the D.C. Circuit but did so on
the basis of Suspension Clause analysis rather than Due Process
84
Clause analysis. Additionally, another D.C. Circuit opinion finding
constitutional rights inapplicable to Guantanamo detainees that was
issued while Boumediene was pending before the Supreme Court was
85
vacated and remanded in the wake of that decision.
In sum, pre-Boumediene case law generally suggested that the Fifth
Amendment did not apply to detainees at Guantanamo, but the
Second Circuit and one D.C. district judge held otherwise—with both
doing so on the basis of the very test for constitutional rights abroad

79
80
81
82
83
84
85

In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 463 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated, 476
F.3d 981, rev’d, 553 U.S. 723.
Id.
Id. at 464.
476 F.3d at 981–82.
Id. at 1011 (citations omitted).
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“An examination of the law at the
time the plaintiffs were detained reveals that even before [the D.C. Circuit’s decision in]
Boumediene, courts did not bestow constitutional rights on aliens located outside sovereign
United States territory. Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, consistent with Eisentrager’s rejection of the proposition ‘that the Fifth Amendment confers rights upon all persons, whatever their nationality, wherever they are located and whatever their offenses,’
concluded that non-resident aliens enjoy no constitutional rights.” (quoting Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950))), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (remanding “for
further consideration in light of Boumediene v. Bush”).
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that won the approval of a majority of the Supreme Court in Boume86
diene.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF BOUMEDIENE FOR DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene unsettled that understanding, though the majority opinion for the Court did not speak directly to the issue of due process rights. Boumediene held that the
Suspension Clause applied to detainees at Guantanamo; whether
other parts of the Constitution applied as well remained, and indeed
remains, unclear.
Reaching constitutional issues avoided in Rasul and Hamdan,
Boumediene announced the application of the Suspension Clause to
87
detainees at Guantanamo. Much of the Court’s analysis sounded
distinctly Suspension Clause-specific, emphasizing the unique importance of the availability of habeas relief in order to keep the judiciary
present and active, rather than permitting it to be sidelined by the
political branches: “The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues
raised by these cases and the fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access to a judicial forum for a period of years rend88
er these cases exceptional.” Moreover, the Court seemed at pains to
emphasize the narrowness of its holding:
Our decision today holds only that petitioners before us are entitled to
seek the writ; that the DTA [Detainee Treatment Act] review procedures
are an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus; and that petitioners in
these cases need not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of Ap89
peals before proceeding with their habeas actions in the District Court.

86

87
88
89

For comparison to an interesting and complicated line of cases assessing whether the
Fifth Amendment applies to takings claims made by aliens regarding property located
abroad, see Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the
ability of an Uzbek citizen to recover under the Takings Clause); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus.
Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing whether a Sudanese corporation had standing to bring a takings suit against the United States); and Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 570 (2010) (“Nothing in Boumediene suggests that the Court intended its holding to broadly apply to the Bill of Rights or to the takings clause, in
particular.”). For discussion of these cases, their implications, and their relationship to
Boumediene, see Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow
the Flag?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 673 (2010); and Steve Vladeck, Doe, Atamirzayeva, and Fallujah: When Stealth Overruling Produces Incoherent Doctrine, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 3, 2010),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/12/doe-v-united-states-when-stealthoverruling-produces-incoherent-doctrine.html.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 795.
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At the same time, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court also
emphasized a broader refusal to permit judicially enforced protections to be eliminated by the political branches. This wider logic of
upholding the constitutional separation of powers and defending the
reach of the judiciary suggested a reading of Boumediene that was not
Suspension Clause-specific: “To hold the political branches have the
power to switch the Constitution on or off at will . . . would permit a
striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a
regime in which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what
90
the law is.’” If Boumediene stood for the proposition that the courts
should not be deliberately shut out by the political branches, then the
decision seemed to extend to at least some other parts of the Constitution, especially those frequently associated with judicial enforcement.
Writing in dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the majority for
91
neglecting to engage in any due process analysis. The Chief Justice
argued that, if the detention review procedures at issue in the case
fulfilled the constitutional requirements of due process, then they
could not be unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause; and,
moreover, that those procedures must have fulfilled the requirements
of due process in that they satisfied the presumably higher standards
owed to American citizens located on American soil, as articulated by
92
the Supreme Court four years earlier in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld in a plurality opinion that Justice Kennedy himself joined. Chief Justice Roberts pointed specifically to the majority’s lack of due process analysis: “The majority expressly declines to decide whether the CSRT
93
procedures, coupled with Article III review, satisfy due process.”
Then, applying the framework announced in Hamdi, he concluded
that “the system we have here . . . is adequate to vindicate whatever
94
due process rights petitioners may have.” For Chief Justice Roberts,
if the detainees’ due process rights had not been violated, then habeas review simply had nothing more to offer. Thus, the Chief Justice’s dissent underscored the disconnect between the abundance of

90
91

92
93
94

Id. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
The majority was explicit in this respect. See id. at 785 (“[W]e make no judgment whether
the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy due process standards . . . .”); see also Neuman,
supra note 5, at 574 (noting that in Boumediene “the Supreme Court found that the Guantanamo detainees were protected by the Suspension Clause without first inquiring whether they had rights under the Due Process Clause”).
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 808.
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Suspension Clause analysis and the absence of Due Process Clause
analysis found in the majority opinion.
Over the Chief Justice’s dissent, the Supreme Court had concluded that at least one constitutional protection—that of habeas relief—extended to detainees at Guantanamo. Whether other constitutional rights also applied remained undetermined, with suggestive
language pointing in rather opposite directions.
IV. POST-BOUMEDIENE CASE LAW
In the wake of Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit faced the question left
unresolved by the Supreme Court of whether the Due Process Clause
95
accompanied the Suspension Clause’s extension to Guantanamo.
In Kiyemba v. Obama, the D.C. Circuit read Boumediene as decidedly
Suspension Clause-specific, holding that “the due process clause does
not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign ter96
ritory of the United States.” The court explained that the Supreme
Court “had never extended any constitutional rights to aliens detained outside the United States; Boumediene therefore specifically li-

95

96

Where possible, the D.C. Circuit has avoided the issue. When confronted by the issue in
Rasul v. Myers, the D.C. Circuit noted the Supreme Court’s deliberately narrow holding in
Boumediene: “[T]he [Supreme] Court in Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb
existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional provisions, other
than the Suspension Clause.” 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Having thus suggested
in passing that the D.C. Circuit did not view any part of the Constitution other than the
Suspension Clause as applying to Guantanamo, the court proceeded not to “decide
whether Boumediene portends application of the Due Process Clause and the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause to Guantanamo detainees,” instead resolving the case on
other grounds. Id. The briefs in Rasul presented quite divergent views on the issue.
Compare Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Rasul et al. at 7
n.4, Rasul, 563 F.3d 527 (No. 06-5209) (“This Court’s assertion in Kiyemba that ‘the due
process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States’ simply cannot be harmonized with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene.” (citation omitted)), and id. at 9 (“But even if Boumediene’s holding
were limited to the Suspension Clause, its functional test compels the same result with respect to the Fifth Amendment due process clause.”), with Supplemental Brief of Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 3, Rasul, 563 F.3d 527 (No. 06-5209) (“[T]his Court’s recent,
post-Boumediene decision in Kiyemba v. Obama holds that aliens held at Guantanamo do
not have due process rights, and is controlling authority here.” (citation omitted)). Similarly, dissenting in part in another case, Judge Griffith pointedly avoided the issue of
Boumediene’s implications for due process. Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 525 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., dissenting in part) (“[W]hether the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment reaches these detainees is simply not part of the inquiry required
in this case.”).
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010),
reinstated by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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97

mited its holding to the Suspension Clause.” The D.C. Circuit’s de98
cision in Kiyemba was vacated by the Supreme Court but then was
99
reinstated by the D.C. Circuit. Thus, the post-Boumediene law in the
D.C. Circuit remains that Fifth Amendment protections do not ex100
tend to aliens detained at Guantanamo.
One member of the D.C. Circuit confirmed that position in a subsequent round of Kiyemba litigation. When the Kiyemba petitioners
invoked due process rights as a basis for possessing some authority in
determining the location of their own resettlement after release from
101
Guantanamo, the D.C. Circuit firmly rejected their claims. Concurring, Judge Kavanaugh affirmed his circuit’s previous explanation
that, even after Boumediene, the Due Process Clause did not apply to
Guantanamo. He noted that, “[i]n Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme
Court held that the Guantanamo detainees possess constitutional habeas corpus rights” and then explained that “[t]he detainees argue
102
that they must possess due process rights if they have habeas rights.”
Nonetheless, Judge Kavanaugh’s reading of the D.C. Circuit’s position was clear: “This Court has since stated that the detainees possess

97
98

99
100

101

102

Id. at 1032.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010); cf. Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 513–14 (2010) (criticizing
the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion as improperly applying Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Interestingly, in the process of the D.C. Circuit’s reinstating its earlier decision, Judge
Rogers’s concurrence appeared to suggest implicitly the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to detainees at Guantanamo, while rejecting their particular claims based on it.
But that concurrence, of course, is not binding law. Id. at 1051–52 (Rogers, J., concurring) (“Whatever role due process and the Geneva Conventions might play with regard to
granting the writ, petitioners cite no authority that due process or the Geneva Conventions confer a right of release in the continental United States when an offer of resettlement abroad in an ‘appropriate’ country is made in good faith and remains available. In
Boumediene, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the adaptability of the habeas remedy, regardless of the reason the underlying detention is unlawful. The adaptable nature of the habeas remedy is intrinsic to the writ itself, and petitioners’ current circumstances undermine their claim that the habeas remedy, even accounting for the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause and the Geneva Conventions, requires their release into the continental
United States pending resettlement abroad.” (citation omitted)).
Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 516 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The Government has declared
its policy not to transfer a detainee to a country that likely will torture him, and the district court may not second-guess the Government’s assessment of that likelihood. Nor
may the district court bar the Government from releasing a detainee to the custody of
another sovereign because that sovereign may prosecute or detain the transferee under
its own laws. In sum, the detainees’ claims do not state grounds for which habeas relief is
available.”).
Id. at 518 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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103

no constitutional due process rights.” That remains the position of
104
the D.C. Circuit.
While the D.C. Circuit has thus held that, even after Boumediene,
the Due Process Clause does not extend to aliens at Guantanamo, it is
worth noting a passage from the D.C. Circuit’s 2007 opinion in Boumediene that might provide grounds for reconsideration of this position should the issue ever be reassessed en banc. In that 2007 opinion, which was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court’s
decision in Boumediene, the court of appeals stated: “There is the notion that the Suspension Clause is different from the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendments because it does not mention individuals and
105
those amendments do . . . . That cannot be right.” In other words,
at least before Boumediene was decided by the Supreme Court, the
D.C. Circuit contended that application of the Suspension Clause
could not be distinguished from application of the Fifth Amendment.
Perhaps the court might, in some en banc reconsideration of its understanding of Boumediene, return to that conclusion, though now
pointing in the direction of recognizing the applicability of the full
panoply of constitutional rights.
The D.C. District Court, characterizing the D.C. Circuit’s Kiyemba
analysis as dicta, generally has been careful to avoid tackling the issue
of whether the Due Process Clause follows the Suspension Clause’s
106
extension to Guantanamo.
But the law of the circuit currently
seems quite clear that it does not.

103
104

105
106

Id.
One finds relatively little reliance on this holding in the government’s briefs in Guantanamo litigation, perhaps indicating a concern that the holding is a tenuous one. One also finds that courts themselves are reluctant to rest too much on this holding, instead
providing alternate grounds for resolving Guantanamo cases “even if” detainees are at
some point vindicated in their due process claims. See id.
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
See Al-Qurashi v. Obama, 733 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 n.14 (D.D.C. 2010) (“[I]t remains uncertain to what extent the Due Process Clause applies to the detainees at Guantanamo
Bay.”); Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he Court is spared
from having to wade into the debate over whether the due process principles recognized
by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld also apply to a non-U.S. citizen held at Guantanamo.”); see also Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing
Supreme Court precedent on due process rights in the context of evaluating a Guantanamo detainee’s habeas petition).
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V. POST-BOUMEDIENE SCHOLARSHIP
While the D.C. Circuit has articulated its understanding of Boumediene, scholars also have grappled with the decision. Marc Falkoff and
Robert Knowles captured much of the scholarly emphasis in suggesting that “Boumediene marked the triumph of a particular approach:
the ‘impracticable and anomalous’ test . . . which looks to the particular circumstances of the case to determine whether the application of
a particular constitutional provision is ‘impracticable and anomal107
ous.’”
In turn, they anticipated that the potential application to
aliens abroad of other constitutional provisions, including the Due
Process Clause, would be determined using the same context-specific
analysis.
Other commentators have remarked briefly on the question of
whether Boumediene’s logic extends to the Due Process Clause. They
generally acknowledge the uncertainty of the answer but seem to anticipate its being in the affirmative. For example, Stephen Vladeck
deemed it likely but uncertain that the same considerations that led
to the outcome in Boumediene would point in the direction of finding
the Due Process Clause applicable to detainees at Guantanamo: “It is
possible—if not likely—that Kennedy’s analysis of the Suspension
Clause controls the due process question as well, but the importance
of judicial review to protect the separation of powers was a stand108
alone justification for treating the Suspension Clause differently.”
In other words, while the Suspension Clause could conceivably be
seen as unique, the basic logic of Boumediene seems to apply similarly
to the Due Process Clause. Likewise, Gerald Neuman acknowledged
109
habeas’ distinctive “right to affirmative governmental intervention”
but still anticipated that the Due Process Clause would accompany
the Suspension Clause: “The characterization of Guantanamo as effectively U.S. territory for constitutional purposes probably means
that the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment apply
110
there . . . .”
107
108
109

110

Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited Government, 59
DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 871 (2010) (citations omitted).
Vladeck, supra note 25, at 2143 (footnote omitted).
Neuman, supra note 25, at 287; see also id. (“[Boumediene’s list of relevant factors] was tailored to the Suspension Clause and its case law, and would presumably need modification
to address other rights. The importance of the habeas right itself was an unlisted factor
that apparently argued in favor of broader reach.”).
Id. at 286.
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Benjamin Priester adopted a somewhat different perspective on
the issue. He suggested that, if habeas review is to have any substance
or meaning, the Due Process Clause would need to accompany the
Suspension Clause:
Perhaps, like Munaf v. Geren, this is a situation where the writ runs to the
prisoner but relief is foreclosed on the merits—these aliens, by virtue of
their capture abroad and lack of any ties to the United States, may have
no rights which can be vindicated under U.S. law. Alternatively, if the
[Boumediene] majority’s primary concern is avoidance of rule-of-law-free
zones by assessing de facto sovereignty, then perhaps the Due Process
Clause, not just the Suspension Clause, reaches Guantánamo. Into which
of the two prior categories the Guantánamo detainees fall, then, depends
on whether the rationale of Rasul and Boumediene is really just about ha111
beas or whether it is really about meaningful judicial review.

For Priester, the habeas access provided by Boumediene would seem an
empty promise without accompanying due process rights—though
perhaps the Supreme Court’s holding in Hamdan that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to Guantanamo detainees
would offer the basis for at least some type of substantive law to be invoked in habeas litigation, even if the Due Process Clause were not
112
available.
More boldly, Richard Murphy and Afsheen Radsan argued that
the combination of Hamdi and Boumediene demands the widespread
extraterritorial application of the Due Process Clause. They wrote:
“Together, Hamdi and Boumediene give detainees a due process right
to judicial review of the government’s decision to deprive them of
their liberty after their imprisonment had started. . . . The logic of
Boumediene’s five-justice majority opinion is that the Due Process
113
Clause binds the executive worldwide—from Alaska to Zimbabwe.”
Murphy and Radsan avowed that, “[o]n this view, even if there were
no constitutional right to habeas corpus, the Guantanamo detainees
could have argued that the Due Process Clause by itself required
114
more protections than the government had given them.”

111
112

113
114

Benjamin J. Priester, Terrorist Detention: Directions for Reform, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1021,
1036 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006); see also Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Hamdan and
Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1524 (2007)
(highlighting the “Court’s views on the enforceability of the Geneva Conventions and
specifically that of Common Article 3”).
Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 410–11 (2009).
Id. at 436.
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Finally, Neal Katyal, who would later become acting solicitor general, offered congressional testimony in July 2008 explaining his understanding of Boumediene. He encapsulated the decision thus:
[T]he Constitution applies to Guantanamo Bay. . . . It is incorrect to believe that this principle applies only to the Suspension Clause. After all,
habeas corpus exists to protect ‘the rights of the detained by a means
consistent with the essential design of the Constitution.’ Boumediene’s
right to habeas corpus would be meaningless if there were no substantive
115
rights to protect.

Hence, while demonstrating some variety in understandings of
Boumediene and while admitting the uncertainty associated with the
116
case’s implications, scholars generally anticipate the decision’s logic
applying not only to the Suspension Clause but also to the Due
Process Clause, contrary to the conclusion of the D.C. Circuit. Yet,
those scholars’ treatment of that crucial issue has emerged only in
the form of passing comments, without thoroughly assessing the
range of possible readings of Boumediene or the broader question of
how habeas review relates to due process protections.

VI. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE AND THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
Neither the courts nor the commentators have offered a clear,
comprehensive, and convincing understanding of Boumediene’s implications for the applicability of due process protections to Guantanamo. Before the next Part of this Article suggests five such understandings and specifies the most compelling among them, this Part
delves into a fundamental underlying question largely neglected by
117
jurists and scholars : in general, what is the relationship between
118
habeas rights and due process rights?
115

116

117

Implications of the Supreme Court’s Boumediene Decision for Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Neal
K. Katyal, Professor of National Security Law, Georgetown University Law Center), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/73.
See Ten Questions on National Security, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5007, 5009–17 (2008) (asking, “Does a terrorism suspect who is not a citizen of the United States have due process
rights if interrogated outside the territory of the United States?” and suggesting “Yes”
from Stephen Vladeck and Tung Yin, and “No, with qualifications” from Geoffrey S. Corn
and coauthors Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson).
One notable exception is Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due
Process and the Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96
VA. L. REV. 1361 (2010). Redish and McNamara’s original and provocative article argues
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause supersedes the Suspension Clause. As
they readily admit, “the argument appears never to have been suggested by scholars,
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As one recent article aptly recognizes, “the relationship between
the Suspension and Due Process Clauses remains completely unset119
tled.” It is a relationship that historical understandings alone cannot illuminate: as important as such inquiries are to keeping faith
with the Constitution, historical explorations have not, on their own,
been able to settle even the more limited issue of how habeas corpus
120
should be conceived in the context of today’s detentions, and those
explorations reveal an even less determinative historical record as to
how habeas relates to due process generally.
This Part begins by discussing jurists’ and scholars’ generally brief
thoughts on that relationship, thus revealing how little attention has
been paid to it. In large part, that lacuna has persisted because of a
sensible presumption that both habeas and due process rights typically
are available, a presumption that generated little reason to parse
which particular protections are associated with each constitutional
guarantee. Then, reflecting the need for precisely such analysis in
the wake of Boumediene, this Part moves past the prior commentary by
setting out five overarching ways of understanding the relationship:
in the first, habeas rights involve jurisdiction while due process rights
relate to substantive claims; in the second, habeas rights involve a certain remedy while due process rights relate to substantive claims; in

118

119
120

much less judicially accepted.” Id. at 1391. Regardless of its independent strengths and
weaknesses, their argument is decidedly contrary to the understanding of the Supreme
Court as presented in Boumediene, and addresses an issue that is roughly the converse of
the subject of this Article: their work concerns the possible requirements of due process
when habeas rights have been suspended, whereas this Article assesses the existence of due
process rights where habeas rights have been extended.
Treating this broader question as implicated by Boumediene takes seriously the notion that
Guantanamo-related decisions are not “exotic” but, instead, tackle manifestations of
deep, persistent issues facing federal courts. See generally Judith Resnik, Detention, the War
on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 584 (2010) (contending that
“neither the problems nor the case law represented in 9/11 detention are exotic”).
Redish & McNamara, supra note 117, at 1364.
See, e.g., ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY
12–19 (2001) (reviewing the “sparse” “history of the Clause at the [Constitutional] Convention”); Meltzer, supra note 2, at 26 (“[T]he [Boumediene] opinions spilled a great deal
of ink about the status of habeas corpus in English and American history leading up to
the Founding, and Justice Scalia succeeded in part in inducing Justice Kennedy to address matters on these terms. The difficulty with the resulting debate . . . is the absence
of applicable precedents . . . .”); Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533 (2007) (using historical evidence to argue that suspending habeas does not make an otherwise illegal detention legal); Shapiro, supra note
5, at 61 (contending that the historical evidence indicates a conclusion contrary to Morrison’s); Tyler, supra note 5, at 627 (“The Convention debates over the proposed Suspension Clause were quite limited.”); Vladeck, supra note 5, at 942, 959–63 (discussing the
origins of the Suspension Clause).
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the third, habeas rights inherently carry with them certain minimal
due process guarantees while due process rights include minimal
protections of the type associated with habeas; in the fourth, the Suspension Clause governs structural constitutional relations among the
branches of government while the Due Process Clause provides rights
to individuals; and in the fifth, habeas review is an open-ended exercise of judges’ equitable discretion to remedy what they deem to be
unjust imprisonment.
A. Others’ Reflections on the Relationship Between the Suspension and Due
Process Clauses
While there is no shortage of case law and scholarship on habeas
corpus and on due process, surprisingly little has been written direct121
The
ly exploring the nature of the relationship between the two.
basic assumption, and an entirely sensible one at first blush, seems to
be that due process applies to any judicial proceeding, meaning that
if a habeas action is being adjudicated, then due process—whatever it
might mean in that context—remains applicable. In turn, when
Amanda Tyler writes that “the origins of the Great Writ link it inextricably to core due process safeguards derived from the Great Char122
ter [the Magna Carta] and enshrined in our Constitution,” she appears to suggest that when habeas rights apply, so too do due process
protections. Major Supreme Court decisions on habeas have pro-

121

122

The major focus of scholarship on American habeas practice has been on federal courts’
review of state court convictions. See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND
TO EMPIRE 308 (2010) (“Due to the distinctiveness of the Constitution in the United
States, the major questions surrounding habeas corpus since 1789 . . . centered on the relationship of federal to state courts in the handling of state convictions for felony.”); see
also, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 120 (discussing habeas relief in the context of federal
courts’ review of state court convictions); Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (same); Gary Peller, In
Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 579, 581 (1982)
(same); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993) (same). Such
scholarship follows the emphases of the case law itself. See Azmy, supra note 98, at 514
(noting that “since Reconstruction . . . habeas petitions have almost universally been
brought as collateral challenges to prior criminal-court convictions or to immigration
proceedings”). It seems ironic that today, federal habeas review is primarily postconviction review to ensure the fairness of prior proceedings, but, in the Guantanamo
context, Boumediene imposed federal habeas review because of a distrust of the military
proceedings themselves, thus emphasizing habeas as pre-conviction review. Cf. Resnik,
supra note 118, at 617–18, 675 n.413.
Tyler, supra note 5, at 691–92; see David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and
Due Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2502
(1998) (“The Constitution’s guarantees of the writ of habeas corpus and of due process
are closely interconnected.”).
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123

ceeded similarly. Because the prevailing assumption has been that
habeas and due process generally stand or fall together, the few cases
and writings addressing both habeas and due process have explored
the nature and extent of judicial protections when both clauses are
124
125
inapplicable or, more typically, when both clauses are applicable.
That basic connection has been severed in the wake of Boumediene.
As explained above, Kiyemba announced the D.C. Circuit’s understanding that Boumediene extended habeas rights to Guantanamo
126
without extending due process protections there. Thus, the time is
ripe for identifying conceptions of the relationship between habeas
and due process that can account for what habeas means in the absence of due process. As a practical matter, that is the current state of
the law in the D.C. Circuit; even if the D.C. Circuit reverses itself or is
123

124
125

126

See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953) (evaluating a habeas petition alleging due
process violations); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (same); Frank v. Magnum, 237
U.S. 309, 331 (1915) (declaring “that it is open to the courts of the United States upon an
application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter, to the extent of deciding whether the prisoner has been deprived of
his liberty without due process of law”).
See Tyler, supra note 5, at 605 (implicitly equating suspension of habeas corpus with “imprisonment without due process of law”).
See Cole, supra note 122, at 2484 (discussing the requirements of “the Suspension Clause
and the Due Process Clause, read together”); id. at 2494 (“[W]henever the government
detains an individual and bars all judicial review of the legality of her detention, it gives
rise to a constitutional violation of both the Due Process Clause and the Suspension
Clause.”); id. at 2503 (“This is not to say that the Suspension Clause and the Due Process
Clause are redundant. . . . But at their core, both habeas corpus and due process require
that taking an individual into custody be subject to the rule of law. . . . The two principles
work in tandem to require judicial review of the legality of all executive detentions. Barring judicial review of any such detention would violate due process, and any such detention must be redressable on habeas corpus.”); Shapiro, supra note 5, at 72–73 (“[T]he
Suspension Clause, perhaps coupled with other provisions, especially the guarantee of
due process, imposes an obligation on the federal government to make the essence of the
Great Writ available in some judicial forum . . . .”). While Trevor Morrison acknowledges
certain “interests protected in liberty deprivation cases not only by the Due Process
Clause but also by the Suspension Clause itself,” Morrison, supra note 120, at 1612, he also examines “the status of the separate due process interest in fair process,” which he
maintains “need not be displaced by a valid suspension” of habeas corpus. Id. at 1610.
Hence, Morrison is interested in due process in the absence of habeas, which he views as
potentially upheld by branches other than the judiciary and even enforced in courts ex
post, whereas this Article examines the possibility of habeas in the absence of due
process, which is the D.C. Circuit’s current view of the rights possessed by Guantanamo
detainees after Boumediene.
Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting decisions that
“hold that the due process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in
the sovereign territory of the United States” and stating that “[i]t cannot be that because
the court had habeas jurisdiction, it could fashion the sort of remedy petitioners desired”
(citation omitted)), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), reinstated by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
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reversed, accepting the circuit’s current position for the sake of this
Article’s discussion opens up the conceptual challenge of understanding how these two core constitutional protections relate to each
other.
Simply put, existing case law offers no clarity regarding the relationship between habeas and due process. The Supreme Court’s early, landmark pronouncement on habeas emerged, through an opi127
nion by Chief Justice Marshall, in Ex parte Bollman.
Yet, Bollman
involved the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions and did
not shed much light on the general substantive content of such petitions, instead evaluating the particular requirements for the charge
128
of treason at issue in the case. The phrase “due process” appeared
nowhere in Marshall’s opinion for the Court or in Justice Johnson’s
dissent.
Subsequent centuries of Supreme Court jurisprudence have not
resolved how habeas review relates to due process protections or even
offered much clarity as to the nature of the relationship. Nor has
such analysis seemed necessary: with both habeas and due process
rights generally applicable, there has seemed to be little reason to distinguish between the protections associated with each. For example,
Justice Brennan stated that “there is nothing novel in the fact that today habeas corpus in the federal courts provides a mode for the redress of denials of due process of law. Vindication of due process is
129
precisely its historic office.” While Brennan seemed to suggest that
protecting due process is the central role of habeas review, earlier
Justice Clark had gone even further in suggesting it to be habeas’ only
role. Clark argued that, “[r]egardless of whether or not the scope of
inquiry on habeas corpus has been expanded, the function of the
courts has always been limited to the enforcement of due process re130
quirements” —in other words, protecting due process is the sole
function of habeas review. Regardless of whether either or both of
Clark’s or Brennan’s statements accurately reflected the law at the
131
time of writing or today, both do little to illuminate exactly how the

127
128
129
130
131

8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
Id. at 125–37.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 402 (1963).
Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 236 (1953).
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Pitney appeared to adopt a less constrained position than
Justice Clark’s. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915) (denying a habeas petition after concluding that the prisoner had “not shown to have been deprived of any
right guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment or any other provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States; on the contrary, he has been convicted, and is now held in

750

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:3

guarantees of habeas review should be understood in the absence of
the protections of due process.
In contrast to Clark and Brennan’s apparent confidence that habeas review provides, at a minimum, for the protection of due
process, Justice Scalia, in a 2001 dissent, suggested that the Suspension Clause provides no substantive guarantee whatsoever in the absence of other protections: “A straightforward reading of [the Suspension Clause] discloses that it does not guarantee any content to
(or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion)
132
be suspended.” Scalia added, “If one reads the Suspension Clause
as a guarantee of habeas relief, the obvious question presented is:
133
What habeas relief?”
Scalia’s suggestion as to the Suspension
Clause’s lack of substantive content emerged in the context of a dispute over habeas jurisdiction and did not command the votes of a
majority of the Court, so—regardless of its merits or lack thereof—its
helpfulness for resolving the nature of habeas’ relation to due
134
process seems limited.
In the end, one must admit that, for all of the courts’ lofty invocation of habeas review as central to the Anglo-American legal identity,
precisely what that review, on its own, offers is difficult to articulate.
Indeed, in the same case from which Scalia dissented, the Court’s majority explicitly avoided having “to answer the difficult question of
135
what the Suspension Clause protects.” Perhaps all that can be said
with certainty based on the case law is that habeas proceedings “can
vary greatly: review can range from de novo judicial decision of all
pertinent questions of fact and law to a highly deferential inquiry into
136
only some aspects of prior, nonjudicial determinations.”
Indeed, much like jurists, scholars have alluded briefly to various
understandings of how habeas relief interacts with due process guarantees but have offered no compelling and coherent vision of that relationship, instead generally operating on the assumption that both

132
133
134
135
136

custody, under ‘due process of law’ within the meaning of the Constitution” (emphasis
added)).
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 341.
Note that Scalia treated analysis of the due process claims raised in the same case as a
matter entirely discrete from his analysis of the habeas issues raised there. Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 301 n.13 (majority opinion).
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2049.
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137

habeas and due process apply. Some commentators have suggested
that the Suspension Clause is a functional enabler of due process
138
One writes:
rights, without clarifying exactly what that means.
“Habeas corpus functions as a minimal guarantor of due process by
requiring, upon issuance of the writ or an order to show cause, an
executive detainor to justify the legality of the petitioner’s deten139
tion.”
One might suggest that this is a casual rather than formal
reference to the notion of due process, and that the basic notion of
fair treatment, rather than the actual constitutional guarantee of due
140
process, is being invoked.
But others are quite clear that it is the
specific due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment that they
view habeas as securing. One scholar writes that “suspension operates as an ‘on/off’ switch for this due process right and possibly other
141
portions of the Constitution as well.” Another comments that “the
habeas corpus remedy is essential to the full realization of certain
other guarantees, most particularly that of due process of law in the
142
Fifth Amendment.”
Note the emphasis here on habeas relief as a
143
“remedy” : from this perspective, habeas provides a court with
137

138
139

140

141
142

143

Cf. Tyler, supra note 5, at 682 (“Fleshing out the precise contours of how the suspension
power intersects with the individual rights enshrined in our Constitution is a daunting
task itself worthy of an entire article.”).
For a brief discussion of the role of habeas review’s assessment of jurisdiction in ensuring
due process, see Woolhandler, supra note 121, at 598–601.
Tor Ekeland, Note, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, of the United
States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 1477 (2005). Ekeland
also suggests that the suspension of habeas should not imply the absence of due process
because the latter would apply to judicial review of whether suspension is constitutional
in the particular instance. Id. at 1515. The judicial reviewability of suspension is another
debate entirely, see Shapiro, supra note 5, at 77–80; Amanda L. Tyler, Is Suspension a Political Question?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 333, 336 (2006) (arguing in favor of judicial review of suspension), but any process that may be due in that regard would be rather different from
the due process claims of individual detainees under examination in this Article, for
whom habeas has decidedly not been suspended, as Boumediene makes clear.
Cf. Cole, supra note 122, at 2501–02 (“When the executive takes a person into custody
and denies access to a court to determine whether the custody is in violation of applicable
law, whether statutory, regulatory, or constitutional, it has deprived that person of liberty
without due process in the most basic sense.”).
Tyler, supra note 139, at 386.
Shapiro, supra note 5, at 64; see also DUKER, supra note 6, at 268 (“Habeas corpus was thereby becoming a means for the articulation of modern-day substantive due process . . . .”);
id. at 312 (“As procedural due process expanded so did habeas corpus.”).
See also Shapiro, supra note 5, at 64–65 (explaining that “a remedy of this kind is essential
to the realization of the due process rights of those in custody”); cf. Cole, supra note 122,
at 2502 (“Habeas corpus is, of course, the traditional remedy for unlawful custody.”); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2038 (“[A] grant of habeas jurisdiction not only authorizes
courts to hear cases, but also confers on those who can invoke the jurisdiction a right to
the remedy of release unless the custodian can show that detention is lawful.”); Tyler, supra note 139, at 338 (referring to habeas review as “the only meaningful judicial remedy
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something to do in response to a violation, in the detention context,
of due process or some other protection, namely to order release of
the prisoner. In a sense, approaching habeas this way makes it seem
145
roughly akin to a Bivens action : habeas is seen as carrying no particular substantive guarantees of its own but, instead, as empowering
courts to respond to substantive guarantees contained in other parts
of the Constitution and elsewhere, by ordering release (rather than
ordering the payment of money found in the Bivens context).
Others, in contrast, have suggested the potential for substantive
standards to be identified in the habeas context without recourse to
notions of due process at all. Baher Azmy argues that Boumediene’s
extension of habeas “to Guantanamo necessarily carries with it an entitlement to substantive adjudication of the petition, even absent an
entitlement to individual rights based on the Constitution or interna146
tional law.”
Azmy readily admits that, on this reading, Boumediene
demanded the construction of habeas standards relatively unknown
to previous American jurisprudence: “Boumediene issued a largely unlimited invitation to the lower courts to create a whole new corpus of
habeas law in the context of military detention—a body of law that,
save for several marquee Civil War-era cases, has largely remained
147
undeveloped since Reconstruction.”
While Boumediene may have
“offered little specific guidance to courts on remand for the adjudica148
tion of factual disputes or mixed questions,”
Azmy points to the
“elementary procedural and evidentiary rules” that district courts, in
responding to Boumediene, have begun to establish in order to resolve
habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees as indications that trial
judges are “amply equipped” to formulate substantive legal standards
149
to govern this relatively uncharted type of habeas review. This view
of habeas proceedings conceives of them as all-encompassing proceedings rather than as narrower matters that rely upon other consti-

144

145
146
147
148
149

for unconstitutional deprivations of liberty”); Woolhandler, supra note 121, at 580 (stating that “habeas is a vehicle for remedying constitutional violations” and discussing “the
federal habeas remedy”).
See Shapiro, supra note 5, at 93 (“The remedial-substantive link . . . does not mean that
the function of the writ is to protect all elements of the due process guarantee, either as
that guarantee was originally envisioned or as it has evolved over the centuries. Rather, in
both its inception and its development (though recent years have seen some significant
expansion), the writ was understood as the method of challenging the lawfulness of detention.”).
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Azmy, supra note 98, at 457.
Id. at 450 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 514.
Id. at 515, 514.
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tutional guarantees to supply substantive grounds for a prisoner’s
complaint. Somewhat similarly, if conversely, Trevor Morrison has
argued that suspension of habeas corpus leaves intact “the separate
due process interest in fair process,” meaning that due process, on its
own, offers protections independent of those secured through habeas
review but somewhat similar to them in guarding against unlawful
150
imprisonment.
Finally, David Cole, writing under the assumption that (and in a
time when) habeas relief and due process protections both seemed
generally applicable, portrayed the relationship between the two sets
of rights as rather malleable. Cole argued: “To hold someone in detention without affording her a judicial forum to test whether the detention is lawful (in any respect) is the very essence of a deprivation
151
of liberty without due process.” Cole’s reference here to “a judicial
forum” seems to suggest that due process itself might provide the jurisdiction needed for a court to hear a prisoner’s complaint, thus effectively providing protections similar to those associated with habeas.
Cole continued by claiming that “a writ of habeas corpus provides a
152
remedy for all executive detentions in violation of law,” thus further
suggesting that habeas should be understood as a remedy. But Cole’s
fundamental point seemed to be that we need not discern the precise
guarantees of each constitutional clause because what we really must
153
understand is how they operate when “read together” —a reasonable and widely shared position in 1998 when Cole wrote, but one that
leaves unsolved the post-Boumediene puzzle of how to parse the discrete constitutional protections offered by the Suspension and Due
Process Clauses.
For both jurists and scholars, the basic assumption has been that
habeas review aims, at least in part, to uncover and address “impri154
sonment without due process of law.” But does habeas review utterly depend on due process guarantees? And what might it look like in
their absence?

150
151
152
153
154

Morrison, supra note 120, at 1610.
Cole, supra note 122, at 2494.
Id.
Id. at 2495.
Tyler, supra note 5, at 605.
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B. Five Overarching Conceptions of the Relationship Between the Suspension
and Due Process Clauses
1. Habeas as Jurisdiction, Due Process as Substantive Law
One promising view of the relationship between the two constitutional clauses is that the Suspension Clause’s provision of habeas
rights offers jurisdiction while the Due Process Clause provides a basis
for substantive claims. This understanding suggests that the Suspension Clause ensures that the courthouse doors are not shut to an individual who has been detained by the executive branch and does so
by providing jurisdiction for the court to hear from the detainee. On
this conception, the Suspension Clause offers no grounds for the
content of the detainee’s complaint or for judicial remedies in response: it simply provides a basis for guaranteeing that the detainee
can be heard by a judge. The substantive grounds for a detainee to
challenge the executive branch’s detention and for a judge to authorize a remedy must come from elsewhere, whether the Constitution,
155
the common law, or a statute. The Due Process Clause, of course,
would constitute a significant source of such substantive grounds for
a habeas petition.
The Supreme Court appeared to tilt toward this jurisdictional understanding of habeas in the Court’s unanimous opinion in Munaf v.
156
Geren, handed down on the same day as Boumediene. In Munaf, the
Court found that statutory habeas jurisdiction extended to two American citizens held by coalition forces in Iraq but that, on the merits,
they were not entitled to the relief sought, namely the blocking of
their transfer to Iraqi law enforcement. The Court thus simultaneously concluded that “United States courts have jurisdiction over
habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of American citizens challenging their detention in Iraq” and that “[u]nder circumstances such as
those presented here, however, habeas corpus provides petitioners
157
with no relief.” In a sense, this result seems very simple: the federal

155

156
157

In INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302–03 (2001), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the violations subject to review in habeas proceedings are not limited to constitutional errors.
See also Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 344–46 (1974) (rejecting the government’s
argument that only constitutional claims are cognizable on habeas review and finding
federal law beyond the Constitution to provide grounds for such review).
553 U.S. 674 (2008).
Id. at 680.
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158

habeas jurisdiction statute provided jurisdiction, and yet the peti159
tioners lost on the merits.
On further reflection, however, it is worth considering precisely
what habeas jurisdiction means in this context. The Court essentially
said that the habeas statute had nothing to offer to the petitioners of
substance—no release, certainly, but also no prevention of their
transfer to Iraqi custody—but it did offer one thing: jurisdiction. In
other words, habeas review got these petitioners (or at least their lawyers) into an American courtroom, even if the substance of that review proved fruitless for them.
Hence, for the Court (1) to refer to district courts’ “habeas juris160
diction,” (2) to distinguish jurisdictional issues from “the merits of
161
the underlying habeas petition,” and ultimately (3) to conclude
162
“that the power of the writ ought not to be exercised” is at least to
suggest that habeas has a jurisdictional function discrete from the
substantive claims made in a habeas petition. The Munaf petitioners
grounded their substantive claims in the Due Process Clause and the
163
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, and lost.
The
Court’s treatment of their jurisdictional claim to habeas review as a
threshold matter and of their substantive claims as discrete grounds
for analysis points toward a particular understanding of the relationship between habeas and due process: the Suspension Clause provides jurisdiction for a prisoner, while the Due Process Clause acts as
an important source of substantive claims that the prisoner can make.
To the extent that Munaf stands for the Court’s approval of this sharp
distinction between the jurisdiction and the substance of a habeas petition, Munaf may prove a far more consequential decision than was
apparent when it was handed down. At the very least, Munaf’s treat-

158
159

160
161
162
163

28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
This result was thus roughly akin to what occurred in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25
(1942), even though the Munaf Court never cited Quirin: the Supreme Court found jurisdiction to entertain the habeas petition, but then denied relief on the merits. I am
grateful to Sophie Brill for pointing out this similarity.
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 689.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 692.
See id. (“The habeas petitioners argue that the writ should be granted in their cases because they have ‘a legally enforceable right’ not to be transferred to Iraqi authority for
criminal proceedings under both the Due Process Clause and the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARR Act), div. G, 112 Stat. 2681-761, and because they
are innocent civilians who have been unlawfully detained by the United States in violation
of the Due Process Clause. . . . We accordingly hold that the detainees’ claims do not state
grounds upon which habeas relief may be granted, that the habeas petitions should have
been promptly dismissed, and that no injunction should have been entered.”).
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ment of habeas and due process as distinctively linked stands in some
tension with Boumediene’s treatment of the Suspension Clause as a
discrete and separable constitutional protection.
For habeas to provide “just” jurisdiction is, in fact, for it to provide
something quite significant when one considers the rather unusual
burden placed on the parties in habeas proceedings from Guanta164
namo. A habeas petition challenging detention at Guantanamo is a
rare form of litigation in which the non-initiating party—in habeas,
165
Hence, once
the government—bears the initial burden of proof.
jurisdiction has been established, the burden is suddenly on the government to justify continued detention, making jurisdiction in itself
consequential. In a sense, habeas jurisdiction acts as something of an
order to show cause in which the government must make its case for
infringing the petitioner’s liberty. Therefore, for habeas to provide a
petitioner with jurisdiction and then for due process to offer that pe164

165

Thanks to Steve Vladeck for calling this important point to my attention and for directing
me to Jared A. Goldstein, Habeas Without Rights, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1165, which argues that
“under traditional habeas principles the government bears the burden of establishing, as
a matter of fact and law, that the detainees are enemy combatants and therefore fall within the scope of the government’s detention power.” Id. at 1169.
See In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-0442, 2008 WL 4858241, at *3 (D.D.C.
Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order) (“The government bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s detention is lawful.”), amended
sub nom. Zadran v. Bush, No. 05-CV-2367, 2009 WL 489083, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2009).
Judges of the D.C. District Court have generally followed this instruction from Judge Hogan’s Case Management Order. See, e.g., Ahmed v. Obama, 613 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53–54
(D.D.C. 2009); Al Odah v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 611
F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Awad v. Obama, 646 F. Supp.
2d 20, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2009); Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2009). In passing, the D.C. Circuit may have intended to express its doubt as to whether placing the
burden on the government is, in fact, necessary, as the court of appeals emphasized that
“the burden in some domestic circumstances has been placed on the petitioner to prove his
case under a clear and convincing standard.” Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 878
(D.C. Cir. 2010). On another occasion, the D.C. Circuit noted that Boumediene may have
suggested that Guantanamo petitioners should bear the burden of proof. Al-Adahi v.
Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1104 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that “Boumediene held only
that the ‘extent of the showing required of the Government in these cases is a matter to
be determined’” and adding in a footnote that “[e]arlier in the opinion the Court
seemed to put the burden on the detainee: the Court stated that ‘the privilege of habeas
corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being
held pursuant to “the erroneous application or interpretation” of relevant law.’” (quoting
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 787, 728–29 (2008))). The government has accepted
the idea that it should bear the burden of proof in Guantanamo habeas proceedings. See
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 16, Al Odah, 648 F. Supp. 2d 1 (No. 10-439),
2011 WL 119343 (“[I]n the unique circumstances of the proceedings here, it is appropriate for the government to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence,
and not to apply the general habeas rule that a petitioner bears the burden to demonstrate his entitlement to the writ.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011). For succinct background on this issue, see Waxman, supra note 37, at 247–48.
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titioner substantive grounds for challenging his detention offers a potent challenge to the government.
2. Habeas as Remedy, Due Process as Substantive Law
Second, and in a slight variation on the conception just offered,
habeas review might offer not jurisdiction (or not only jurisdiction)
but a remedy for violations of the substantive guarantees found in
protections such as the Due Process Clause. This conception in effect
encompasses the idea of habeas providing jurisdiction: by offering a
remedy, habeas review implicitly would provide the grounds for jurisdiction to hear the prisoner’s cause of action that, if successful, would
entitle the prisoner to that remedy.
Justice Scalia presented a variant of this idea in his dissent in
166
Hamdi. He distinguished between due process as a substantive right
and habeas as what he called “the instrument” for its defense: “The
two ideas central to Blackstone’s understanding—due process as the
right secured, and habeas corpus as the instrument by which due
process could be insisted upon by a citizen illegally imprisoned—
found expression in the Constitution’s Due Process and Suspension
167
Clauses.” This understanding effectively treated habeas as a remedy
for due process violations and one that presumed jurisdiction in order to make the remedy available. As Scalia wrote, detention-related
“due process rights have historically been vindicated by the writ of
168
habeas corpus.”
In turn, habeas might offer a vehicle for remedying violations inflicted on prisoners, including violations of the Due
Process Clause, and those violations are identified based on protections external to habeas itself.
3. Habeas as Containing Minimal Due Process Rights
A third understanding of the relationship between the Suspension
and Due Process Clauses incorporates the understandings of both
clauses that have evolved, in practice, over time—understandings that
suggest that the Suspension Clause offers more than just bare-bones
jurisdiction and that the Due Process Clause provides more than just
substantive grounds once jurisdiction has been established. This
conception of the relationship views the Suspension Clause as inhe-

166
167
168

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the
purposes and historical development of habeas corpus and due process).
Id. at 555–56 (citation omitted).
Id. at 557.
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rently containing minimal due process protections of its own, short of
the full-fledged due process rights that would apply if the Due
Process Clause applied as such. Though not logically required by this
view, symmetry would suggest a corresponding understanding of the
Due Process Clause in which due process itself provides habeas-like
opportunities to challenge executive action. That is, one might understand the Suspension Clause to carry with it certain minimal due
process guarantees and, as a symmetrical corollary, for the Due
Process Clause to point in the direction of baseline quasi-habeas
rights.
This view understands habeas review as containing minimal due
169
process protections of its own. Indeed, such an underlying notion
might explain the tendency, discussed above in Part IV, of D.C. district judges handling habeas petitions from Guantanamo detainees to
invoke Supreme Court jurisprudence on due process protections despite the D.C. Circuit’s clear statement that the Due Process Clause
does not apply to Guantanamo. The judges’ inclination seems to be
that some sort of due process guarantees are part and parcel of the
habeas review that Boumediene instructed those judges to oversee. As
Neuman writes, habeas review not only might provide jurisdiction
and/or a remedy but also might inherently offer “certain minimum
170
content” in reviewing detention.
Overall, just as the right to due
process might include a basic right to habeas-like review of imprisonment, so might a right to habeas review include a basic right to
due process. Language from the plurality opinion in Hamdi certainly
pointed in this direction: “[A] court that receives a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy combatant must itself en171
sure that the minimum requirements of due process are achieved.”
Then again, Hamdi dealt with a U.S. citizen detained on U.S. soil, so
it is unclear to what extent the conception of habeas as containing
minimal due process rights was predicated on those circumstances.
Though not logically required by it, this view would seem completed by a corresponding conception of due process as guaranteeing
quasi-habeas rights to challenge executive detention. The Supreme
Court’s prodigious due process jurisprudence makes clear that “‘due

169

170
171

Cf. Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (denying rehearing en banc)
(Griffith, J., dissenting) (“[F]aithful application of Boumediene compels us to provide
Guantanamo detainees the fundamental procedural protections that characterized the Great
Writ in 1789.” (emphasis added) (citing Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 522–23 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (Griffith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
Neuman, supra note 5, at 541.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 (plurality opinion).
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process of law’ requires, at a minimum, that an individual receive notice and a hearing before a neutral adjudicator to determine the law172
fulness of the individual’s detention.” That would seem to suggest
that, at least for a prisoner who has never received such a hearing,
due process effectively requires the basic contours of habeas relief:
that the prisoner be taken before a judge and permitted to challenge
whether sufficient grounds exist to justify imprisonment. In this vein,
Tyler writes that “the core due process right to demand that one’s
custodian justify to a court the legal basis for one’s detention . . . . is
just another means of describing that which is offered in habeas re173
view.”
From this perspective, the constitutional guarantee of due
process would seem to contain within it the basic right to challenge
one’s detention that is more expressly found in a right to habeas review, as a corollary to the idea that habeas review involves certain minimal due process guarantees.
4. Habeas as Structural and Due Process as Individual
A fourth understanding views the relationship between the Suspension and Due Process Clauses as one between a structural constitutional guarantee and a source of protection for individual rights.
The starting place for this conception is the placement of each clause
in the Constitution: the Suspension Clause appears in Section 9 of
Article I, amidst the limitations on congressional authority; in contrast, the Due Process Clause is found in the Bill of Rights. The limits
on Congress, while certainly containing provisions that protect indi174
viduals against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, can be
viewed on the whole as ensuring that Congress does not overstep its
175
bounds vis-à-vis the other two branches.
In other words, Article I
provides a structure for the three branches of government, and the
Suspension Clause is one way of ensuring that Congress possesses the
172

173
174
175

Redish & McNamara, supra note 117, at 1376, 1379 (surveying the Supreme Court’s due
process holdings and the requirements they impose); see, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) (evaluating the administrative review procedures for termination of social security benefits and concluding that those procedures satisfied due process); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (finding constitutionally deficient a New York welfare
program’s termination procedures for failing to satisfy due process).
Tyler, supra note 5, at 682.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
See BADSHAH K. MIAN, AMERICAN HABEAS CORPUS: LAW, HISTORY, AND POLITICS 145
(1984) (“Generally speaking . . . Section 9 disables Congress.”). But see DUKER, supra note
6, at 131–32 (arguing, based on the constitutional location of the Suspension Clause, that
it formed part of “a series of limitations on Congressional power vis à vis the states and the
people” (emphasis added)).
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authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus but only in narrow, de176
In contrast, the Bill of Rights, as is well
fined circumstances.
known, ensured the protection of individual rights in the face of the
177
new federal government created by the Constitution. Consequently, understanding the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as a
bulwark of individual freedoms and liberties is entirely consistent
with its location and function in the Constitution.
To be sure, the Suspension Clause has clear implications for pro178
tecting individual rights, just as the Due Process Clause has structural importance in ensuring responsible behavior by and among the
three branches of government. But implications are different from
essences: and the understanding being advanced here is that the essence of the Suspension Clause is structural, whereas the essence of
the Due Process Clause concerns individual rights. On this conception, the Suspension Clause is really about restraining the political
branches from interfering with judicial review of imprisonment, while
at the same time empowering those branches to do just that in cases
of rebellion or invasion. Habeas review, in turn, is a pure creation of
statutes and the common law and whatever judges might make of
them; but it is constitutionally protected from infringement by the
179
political branches except in narrowly specified circumstances.
In
contrast, the Due Process Clause operates as a constraint against the
federal government as a whole (including all three branches), and
regulates interactions not among branches but between individuals
and the government in all its forms.
This perspective was articulated by Judge Rogers in her dissent
180
from the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Boumediene, an opinion that was
181
later reversed by the Supreme Court.
Rogers made clear her view
176

177

178

179

180
181

At the Constitutional Convention, whether to permit any suspension at all was a subject of
significant debate. For a brief historical overview, see Part I of Redish & McNamara, supra
note 117, at 1367–75.
See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
(1998) (undertaking a holistic examination of the Bill of Rights, the intentions of its authors, and its history).
The Suspension Clause has even been called “[t]he most important human rights provision in the Constitution.” Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the
Constitution, 32 B.U. L. REV. 143, 143 (1952). See generally Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“[T]here is no hermetic separation between individual rights and structural or systemic processes of governance.”).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it.”).
Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 994–95 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J., dissenting), rev’d,
553 U.S. 723 (2008).
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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that the Suspension Clause is a structural component of the Constitution governing the relationship among branches. She first noted that
“[a] review of the text and operation of the Suspension Clause shows
182
that, by nature, it operates to constrain the powers of Congress.”
Judge Rogers then elaborated: “It is unclear where the court finds
that the limit on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is an individual entitlement. The Suspension Clause itself makes no reference
183
to citizens or even persons.”
She then explained at some length
why the D.C. Circuit majority was mistaken to neglect the structural
184
focus of the Suspension Clause, and—anticipating Justice Kennedy’s retort to Chief Justice Roberts—emphasized that the constitutional guarantee of habeas was not necessarily satisfied by procedures
185
that met the standards required by due process.
On the whole,
Judge Rogers, whose basic conclusion in Boumediene was vindicated by
the Supreme Court, presented a view of habeas that emphasizes its
distinctive structural emphasis as governing the separation of powers
among branches, making the function of habeas very different from
that of the Due Process Clause and its guarantee of the rights of individuals.
5. Habeas as Equitable Relief, Due Process as Distinct
Fifth and finally, habeas can be understood as akin to an equitable
power on the part of courts, thus empowering judges to review the
basis for imprisonment according to a judicial sense of fairness rather
than based on any particular substantive guarantees external to habeas itself. Indeed, this understanding comports with habeas’ historical origins, as well as with Justice Brennan’s statement that “habeas
corpus has traditionally been regarded as governed by equitable
186
principles,” and one might view post-Boumediene habeas review as
returning to a past in which habeas review did not seek particular
grounds, such as due process, on which to review imprisonment, but
instead involved wide-spanning judicial inquiry of the justifications
187
for depriving an individual of his liberty by imprisoning him.
In182
183
184
185
186
187

Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 995 (Rogers, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also id. at 996 n.1 (“The Suspension Clause is also distinct from the First Amendment, which has been interpreted as a guarantor of individual rights.”).
See id. at 997–98.
See id. at 1005–06.
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) (citing United States ex rel Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S.
561, 573 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
Cf. Goldstein, supra note 164, at 1169 (“[F]or most of the long history of habeas corpus,
courts resolved habeas claims without undertaking any inquiry into the petitioner’s rights
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deed, Boumediene itself embraced the idea that “[h]abeas ‘is, at its
188
core, an equitable remedy.’”
A recent, exhaustive historical study of habeas by Paul Halliday
provides the context needed to understand the way in which habeas
relief can be seen as courts’ exercise of equitable authority. Halliday
explains that, in England, “[n]o one called habeas corpus an equitable writ. But this should not keep us from considering the ways in
189
which its use was equitable in everything but name.” In exploring
the centuries-old roots of habeas, Halliday finds that particular substantive guarantees external to habeas relief were not necessary for a
prisoner to prevail in his petition. To the contrary, what was needed
was a compelling tale of the unfairness of the prisoner’s imprisonment:
Habeas corpus is a judicial writ, issued when the justices had been convinced by a story that they should examine more closely the circumstances of a person’s imprisonment. The telling of tales, and the discretion of the judges in deciding to heed the moral of such tales, was quite
190
like the process used in most courts of equity.

In turn, Halliday finds that habeas review was traditionally an exceedingly case-specific inquiry, as “justices made an equitable habeas
191
jurisprudence that followed the facts of cases rather than rules.”
And while, to be sure, statutes could prove relevant in ascertaining

188
189

190

191

by determining instead whether the jailer had authority to impose the challenged detention.”).
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 780 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 319 (1995)).
HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 87; see also Vladeck, supra note 5, at 978, 992 (reviewing Halliday’s book and emphasizing “the flexibility, adaptability, and vigor of habeas” and habeas’ character as “a flexible, adaptable, and evolving remedy”). See generally R.J. SHARPE,
THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 5 (1976) (“Habeas corpus became one of the principal weapons in the struggle between common law and equity.”).
HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 92; see also id. at 97 (“Habeas jurisprudence was characterized by principles rather than rules, making it an all-but-equitable instrument in the
judges’ hands.”). Halliday’s historical work offers interesting historical analogues for the
Guantanamo situation that confronted the Boumediene Court, see id. at 207–08 (discussing
cases concerning “the nationality of an applicant for habeas corpus”), with Halliday ultimately suggesting that habeas proceedings provided English judges with “the means to
control all other jurisdictions, wherever, however, and whomever they imprisoned.” Id. at
213. See generally SHARPE, supra note 189, at 182–93 (discussing, historically, the “territorial ambit of habeas corpus”). For background on judicial forms of action in general, see
F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker
eds., 1963).
HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 105; see also Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus in Three Dimensions: Dimension I: Habeas Corpus as a Common Law Writ, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 591,
595 (2011) (noting that, historically, habeas “decisions are united by a strong impetus towards speedy and pragmatic resolutions based on case-specific facts as revealed by direct
investigation and a disinclination to pronounce broad rules of law”).
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whether a particular imprisonment was permissible, the basic inquiry was essentially an equitable one revolving around the discretion
of judges.
That all-encompassing approach to habeas review is one from
193
which, as Halliday acknowledges, American courts have departed.
Yet, for Boumediene to suggest a conception of habeas review as
judges’ exercise of equitable discretion is in accord with historical
precedent, and might even be portrayed as a return to what Halliday
regards as the zenith, over two centuries ago, of robust habeas review:
194
he posits that “the writ’s vigor may have peaked in the 1780s” and
suggests that habeas has historically involved “an ongoing tension . . . between what is in our law and what we would like to be in
195
it.” For Boumediene to lean toward the latter would seem to return
to a conception of habeas review as less rigidly determined by statutes
and precedent and more flexibly exercised under the equitable au196
thority of judges.
Consistent with such a view, the Boumediene Court might have
been exercising its equitable discretion in assessing the procedures
that Congress offered in lieu of habeas to Guantanamo detainees
and, in the end, rejecting them as insufficient. Indeed, this understanding of the majority might provide the best explanation for why it
was not deterred by the Chief Justice’s complaint that there was no
basis for finding a violation of the Suspension Clause without at least

192
193

194
195
196

See HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 105 (“Certainty, like sufficiency, often turned on statute.”).
See id. at 314. For one particularly indicative example, consider the following critical remarks of Justice Jackson in a draft memorandum: “[T]here are no rules. And habeas
corpus has become pretty nearly a judicial plaything in a game without rules.” FREEDMAN,
supra note 120, at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545, 580–86 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The history and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus do not support the application of the writ suggested by five Members of
the Court today. Originally, this writ was granted only when the criminal trial court had
been without jurisdiction to entertain the action. . . . In expanding the scope of habeas
corpus, however, the Court seems to have lost sight entirely of the historical purpose of
the writ. . . . Habeas corpus is not a general writ meant to promote the social good or vindicate all societal interests of even the highest priority. The question rather is whether
this ancient writ, developed by the law to serve a precise and particular purpose, properly
may be employed for the furthering of the general societal goal of grand jury integrity.”).
HALLIDAY, supra note 121, at 314.
Id. at 316.
If one views the exercise of equitable discretion as a key judicial function, then there is an
underlying question of how much this understanding of habeas overlaps with the separation-of-powers perspective. As Travis Crum helpfully put it: precisely what judicial power
is being “separated” if not an equitable one?
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determining whether due process had been satisfied. On behalf of
the majority, Justice Kennedy responded: “Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound, the Suspension
Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant. . . . This is
so . . . even where the prisoner is detained after criminal trial con198
ducted in full accordance with the protections of the Bill of Rights.”
For the Boumediene majority, habeas review provides something of importance even when all of the constitutional guarantees often invoked in such proceedings, including due process, have been provided to the prisoner. That additional something might well be an
opportunity for a court to exercise equitable authority to assess the
fairness of the imprisonment as a whole, rather than just in terms of
particular, discrete constitutional rights such as due process. So
when Boumediene declared that “the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that
he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpreta199
tion’ of relevant law,” it mattered little that, as noted by Azmy
above, there was not much relevant law to be applied in this context.
As long as lower court judges could exercise their equitable discretion to assess detention at Guantanamo, this vision of habeas review
would be fulfilled. In the words of the Court, “common-law habeas
corpus was, above all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application
200
and scope changed depending upon the circumstances.” This view
suggests that habeas review, while perhaps informed by due process
analysis, is not limited to it: to the contrary, the majority’s approach
suggests that habeas review always has independent value, even when
the requirements of due process have been met.
In sum, the relationship between habeas review and due process
can be conceived in five related but distinct ways. Drawing on those
five conceptions of the relationship between habeas and due process
can help us answer this Article’s fundamental question: should Boumediene be read as anticipating that the Due Process Clause will follow
the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo?

197

198
199
200

See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 813–14 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority’s “position of evaluating whether the DTA system is an adequate substitute for habeas review without knowing what rights either habeas or the DTA is supposed
to protect”).
Id. at 785 (majority opinion).
Id. at 779 (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).
Id.
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VII. THEORIES OF BOUMEDIENE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS
Moving from general conceptions of the habeas-due process relationship to more specific readings of Boumediene, this Part offers five
possible understandings of the analytical logic of Boumediene, beginning with those pointing most strongly against finding the Fifth
Amendment applicable to Guantanamo detainees and moving to
those that point most strongly in favor of such a finding. Each draws
on one of the conceptions, explored in the previous Part, of the general terms of the relationship between habeas and due process. As
will be seen, echoes and elements of all five of those conceptions can,
at least to some degree, probably be identified in all five of the readings of Boumediene presented below. Indeed, that overlap is part of
why Boumediene is such a complex decision and one susceptible to a
variety of understandings, and, to be sure, the five general conceptions of the habeas-due process relationship in the last Part and the
five narrower understandings of Boumediene in this Part do not match
up rigidly in a one-to-one fashion. Nonetheless, each of the broader
understandings maps most readily onto a particular reading of Boumediene, and those linkages are explored in Section VII.A. Then, in
Section VII.B, the two most likely candidates for understanding Boumediene’s implications for due process are explored in greater detail,
along with the underlying conceptions of the habeas-due process relationship that they suggest.
A. Theories of Boumediene
1. Boumediene as Suspension Clause-Specific
First, Boumediene might be a strictly Suspension Clause-specific
holding that defends the rights of detainees to challenge their detention. As mentioned above, the Suspension Clause can be seen as
unique among constitutional guarantees: habeas access enables
those imprisoned to receive at least some form of judicial review, rather than leaving them entirely at the discretion of the political
201
branches. Phrased differently, habeas access provides basic jurisdiction in a way that keeps detainees from being shut out entirely from
access to a forum in which their detention can be reviewed. Hence,
201

See Resnik, supra note 118, at 632 (describing Boumediene’s holding “that courts played a
critical role by standing between individuals and the Executive” as the opinion’s “core
premise”).
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consistent with the conception of habeas as providing jurisdiction
and due process as offering substantive grounds for challenging detention is an understanding of Boumediene in which the Supreme
Court treated the Suspension Clause as unique among constitutional
protections: the decision ensured that Guantanamo detainees would
at least be heard by American judges but did not suggest whether
those detainees, once heard, would have recourse to argue for substantive constitutional guarantees as providing content for the detainees’ petitions.
Indeed, as Priester noted in his analysis quoted above, the Su202
preme Court’s decision in Munaf v. Geren seems to suggest that recognizing habeas jurisdiction can be significant even in the absence
203
of any viable, substantive grounds for relief. In the wake of Boumediene, and even in the absence of any recognition of substantive constitutional protections for Guantanamo detainees, Human Rights
204
First has declared that “Habeas Works,” suggesting that extending
the Suspension Clause alone to Guantanamo may have sufficed to establish a meaningful opportunity for detainees to be heard by judges.
Moreover, much of the Court’s opinion in Boumediene reads as Sus205
pension Clause-specific, and of course the D.C. Circuit has interpreted it as such: that interpretation may well be correct if Boumediene rests on the unique role of habeas access in providing some
form of judicial access for those detained. If that interpretation is
right, then the Due Process Clause might not apply to detainees at
Guantanamo: Boumediene was, like Rasul and Hamdan before it, es-

202
203

204

205

553 U.S. 674 (2008).
Cf. Vladeck, supra note 25, at 2145 (“Boumediene may provide an answer to a question that
the earlier case law left unresolved: to show an injury, does the plaintiff have to show that
he would have prevailed on the merits? The Court in Boumediene clearly thought the answer to that question was ‘no.’ Rather, the relevant issue is whether the plaintiff might
possibly be injured by the denial of access to the courts.”).
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 30. But see WITTES, CHESNEY, & BENHALIM, supra note
30, at 3 (“So fundamentally do the judges disagree on the basic design elements of American detention law that their differences are almost certainly affecting the bottom-line
outcomes in at least some instances.”); id. at 6 (“[D]etainees freed by certain district
judges would likely have had the lawfulness of their detentions affirmed had other judges
who have articulated different standards heard their cases. And the reverse is also true.”);
Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C.
L. REV. 769, 848 (2011) (“The persistence of disagreement and unresolved questions regarding the substantive-scope issue in the habeas litigation is problematic on many levels.”).
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“Petitioners . . . are entitled to
the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”); id. at 772
(“[T]he fact that these detainees have been denied meaningful access to a judicial forum
for a period of years render[s] these cases exceptional.”).
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sentially a case about jurisdiction, but not more, and due process
might not share the lofty and distinctive status possessed by habeas
and thus uniquely protected in Boumediene.
2. Boumediene as Judiciary-Defending
In contrast, a second understanding of Boumediene focuses less on
the detainees themselves and more on the judiciary as an institution:
this reading of the decision emphasizes its insistence that the courts
not be silenced or sidelined by the political branches and, instead,
that they defend the separation of powers among those branches.
Understanding Boumediene as a separation-of-powers decision is in accord with a view of the habeas-due process relationship as one distinguishing between structural arrangements among the three branches
and guarantees of liberty for individuals. From this perspective, the
real constitutional violation identified by the Boumediene Court was a
structural overstepping by the political branches, not a deprivation of
individual detainees’ rights to judicial review—and the analysis concerning the separation-of-powers concerns need not dictate the analysis governing individual rights that would become the focus of a due
process inquiry.
Understanding Boumediene as an affirmation of the role of the judiciary would seem consistent with other jurisprudence of Justice
206
Kennedy.
As Vladeck wrote, “Reading Boumediene, one is left with
the distinct impression that for Justice Kennedy, at least, the writ of
habeas corpus is in part a means to an end—a structural mechanism
protecting individual liberty by preserving the ability of the courts to
207
check the political branches.”
In turn, some of Boumediene’s lan206

207

Cf., e.g., Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (“By seeking to prohibit
the analysis of certain legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts must depend for
the proper exercise of the judicial power.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,
449 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (invoking separation-of-powers concerns in prohibiting the legislative and executive branches from reallocating authority); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535–36 (1997) (emphasizing that the separation of powers demands that the proper role of the judiciary be to interpret the Constitution and “say what
the law is” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
Vladeck, supra note 25, at 2110; see id. at 2109 (noting Justice Kennedy’s “repeated allusions to the relationship between habeas corpus and the separation of powers—a recurring (if surprising) theme”); id. at 2111 (“At least where habeas corpus is concerned, the
purpose of judicial review, in Kennedy’s view, appears to be as much about preserving the
role of the courts as it is about protecting the individual rights of the litigants.”); id. at
2112 (discussing “Justice Kennedy’s suggestion that the access to courts protected by the
Suspension Clause is (at least largely) about protecting the courts as such”); see also JUSTIN
J. WERT, HABEAS CORPUS IN AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 205 (2011)
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208

guage suggests that the decision emerged in significant part from
an emphasis on ensuring that the political branches could not deliberately operate in the absence of the judiciary.
The implication of this understanding for due process analysis is
less than clear: perhaps the Suspension Clause alone suffices in pro209
tecting a “seat at the table” for “judicial power”; then again, perhaps
more is necessary, and if so the Due Process Clause is the most likely
next candidate, with its longstanding invocation by American courts
in both procedural and substantive forms. If Boumediene was really
about protecting separation-of-powers principles and affirming the
210
role of the judiciary, then it seems possible that the Due Process
Clause might not share the Suspension Clause’s reach to Guantanamo, but also possible that it might: this structural perspective is simply not decisive for due process analysis. How the Supreme Court
would resolve the issue might well hinge less on abstract legal con-

208

209
210

(“The point at which judicial sympathy with the political regime stopped and judicial institutional independence began occurred [in Boumediene] when the Court perceived that
its institutional power to issue habeas writs was jeopardized and when bare minimum
judicial functions were jettisoned by the regime.”); Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26
CONST. COMMENT. 385, 388 (2010) (“[T]he strong connection between habeas and the
separation of powers elaborated by Justice Kennedy is neither obvious nor necessary. To
the contrary, it is of recent vintage, and finds roots as much in Justice Kennedy’s views on
structural constitutionalism as it does in the storied history of the Great Writ.”); id. at 391
(suggesting that Boumediene “may be best underst[ood] as part of a more general theory
of separation of powers that Justice Kennedy has developed over three decades in cases
unrelated to habeas or the Suspension Clause”); Stephen I. Vladeck, Common-Law Habeas
and the Separation of Powers, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 39, 51 (2010), available at http://www.
uiowa.edu/~ilr/bulletin/ILRB_95_Vladeck.pdf (referring to “the separation-of-powers
doctrine’s odd but undeniable centrality to Justice Kennedy’s analysis for the Boumediene
majority”); Vladeck, supra note 5, at 967 (“Invoking the separation of powers in at least
ten additional passages, Justice Kennedy’s point appeared to be that the Suspension
Clause should be understood, in general, as protecting prisoners by protecting the power
of courts . . . .” (footnote omitted)). A similarly structural understanding of Boumediene
emphasizes its limitation on the exercise of government power as a whole, including all
three branches. See Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 107, at 884 (“[W]hat is striking about
Boumediene is the degree to which the Court’s holding hinges on the nature of the exercise of government power rather than the rights afforded to the detainees as aliens located abroad.”).
See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746 (“The separation-of-powers doctrine, and the history
that influenced its design, therefore must inform the reach and purpose of the Suspension Clause.”); id. at 772 (“The gravity of the separation-of-powers issues raised by these
cases . . . render[s] these cases exceptional.”).
BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF
TERROR 15 (2008).
See Azmy, supra note 98, at 449 (characterizing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Boumediene
as deciding “that the indefinite military detentions in Guantanamo violated fundamental
separation-of-powers principles enshrined by the Suspension Clause”); id. at 466 (“[T]he
normative justification that most fully accounts for [Justice Kennedy’s] view is rooted in
separation of powers and a concern about executive manipulation of legal rules.”).

Feb. 2012]

HABEAS CORPUS AND DUE PROCESS

769

ceptions and more on a practical, empirical assessment of whether
the post-Boumediene habeas litigation has proven sufficient in affirming the role of the judiciary in the government’s activities at Guantanamo.
Moreover, a separation-of-powers understanding of Boumediene
would seem consistent with the Boumediene Court’s apparent disinclination to get involved in the conduct of warfare beyond the limited
area of detention. While the judicial power seems decidedly at home
211
in overseeing detention, it would appear more out of place assess212
ing, for example, the lawfulness of drone strikes launched abroad.
That suggests that the Court might use the separation-of-powers rationale to justify judicial involvement in detention (through habeas)
but not due process-based involvement in the wider conduct of war213
fare.
3. Boumediene as Internationalist
A third approach to making sense of Boumediene is to see it as consistent with a number of recent Supreme Court decisions that aim to
place American human rights practices in line with those of comparable countries around the world. This understanding of the decision emerges less from its text than from a comparison with other
prominent, recent opinions authored or joined by Justice Kennedy.
214
His opinions for the Court in cases such as Roper v. Simmons and
215
Lawrence v. Texas, as well as his votes in cases such as Atkins v. Virgin216
ia, indicate a concern with keeping American human rights practices in line with the practices of similarly situated countries. As
Neuman noted, “The Boumediene opinion said little about interna211

212

213
214
215
216

Cf. Geltzer, supra note 30, at 114 (“In asserting jurisdiction, as in Rasul, or in demanding
procedural protections for American citizens detained on American soil, as in Hamdi, or
in rejecting the proposed procedures and charges for a military commission, as in Hamdan, the Court plausibly could claim merely to be delineating the scope of the law, rather
than circumscribing the scope of the war. After all, it is the judiciary’s job to uphold the
law, while it is the political branches’ responsibility to wage war.”).
See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8–9 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing a lawsuit challenging the alleged authorization of a targeted killing of a dual U.S.-Yemeni citizen hiding in Yemen).
I am appreciative to Sam Rascoff for this analysis.
543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (finding it instructive that the “United States is the only country
in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty”).
539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003) (noting that other countries have recognized the “right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct”).
536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved.”).
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tional and comparative law,” yet “[t]he Court may have been reassured . . . by its awareness of the international human right to a judicial remedy for unlawful detention. The institution of habeas has
spread globally,” producing what Neuman labeled the “internationa217
lization of habeas corpus.”
If Boumediene was grounded, at least in part, in Justice Kennedy’s
urge to ensure that the United States would provide the type of judicial relief dictated by global norms, then it seems likely, but far from
certain, that due process rights would follow. Much as Article 9(4) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights imposes a
human rights law requirement of habeas-style judicial review, Article
9(1) of the Covenant demands what seems to be a rough equivalent
of due process: “No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on
such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are estab218
lished by law.” Then again, perhaps habeas access would be seen as
achieving sufficient accord with global norms to make the extension
of due process rights to Guantanamo unnecessary from this internationalist perspective.
This perspective on Boumediene aligns with the broader idea that
habeas review inherently offers certain minimal due process protections (and, perhaps, vice versa): hence, providing habeas access
complied with global norms not because it offered just bare-bones jurisdiction or rectified a structural constitutional error but because it
produced a mechanism for airing detainees’ grievances as demanded
by internationally accepted principles. Still, even if the internationalist view on Boumediene is properly seen in this light, it remains unclear
what the decision anticipates regarding due process at Guantanamo.
Perhaps the same logic of meeting international standards applies
and points in favor of recognizing due process rights, but perhaps the
very fact that habeas review itself offers the basics of due process
217

218

Neuman, supra note 25, at 275–77; see David D. Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational
Constitutionalism and Guantanamo Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, 51, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/scr/2008/Boumediene_Cole.pdf (“While Boumediene may appear unprecedented from a domestic standpoint, it fits quite comfortably within an important transnational trend of recent years, in which courts of last resort have played an
increasingly aggressive role in reviewing (and invalidating) security measures that trench
on individual rights.”); Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial
Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 23, 46, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
scr/2008/Boumediene_Posner.pdf (“If the Boumediene case is remembered, it will be remembered not as a separation-of-powers case, but as one more step in the march of judicial cosmopolitanism—the emerging view that the interests of nonresident aliens deserve
constitutional protection secured by judicial review.”).
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(1), adopted Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175.
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makes unnecessary the further, and perhaps bolder, extension of the
Due Process Clause to a geographic zone in which the Suspension
Clause already has made inroads.
4. Boumediene as Meaningful Judicial Review
Fourth, as suggested by Priester, one might question whether
219
Boumediene “is really about meaningful judicial review,” rather than
whatever guarantees formally or strictly might be seen as associated
with the Suspension Clause alone. If the decision is indeed about
meaningful judicial review of detention, then extending the Suspension Clause alone to Guantanamo would seem insufficient for fulfil220
ling the real logic and design of the Court’s decision.
Habeas access, as mentioned above, at times seems to be conceived by the Supreme Court as essentially jurisdictional in nature,
meaning that—as Munaf indicates—a habeas petitioner still needs
substantive grounds for relief in order to prevail. In turn, if Boumediene aimed to provide judicial oversight of detentions at Guantanamo that was more than a mere formality, then some sort of comprehensive judicial review would seem necessary—and upholding due
process protections would be a natural emphasis of that review. As
former Guantanamo detainees argued before the D.C. Circuit in Rasul v. Myers, “it is difficult to conceive of a right of habeas without a
corresponding right to due process. In the absence of due process,
221
by what standard is detention to be judged?” There are, as this Article has suggested, conceivable answers to this rhetorical question,
but its thrust is compelling: habeas alone might be viewed as allowing detainees into a courtroom, but due process claims—at the very
least—might be seen as necessary for giving them a basis, once there,
on which to challenge their detention.
On this view, undergirding Boumediene was an equitable conception of habeas review in which such proceedings provide opportuni219
220

221

Priester, supra note 111, at 1036.
Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2–3, Al-Odah v. United States, No. 10-439 (U.S. Sept.
28, 2010), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/AlOdah-cert-petition-9-28-10.pdf (“In Boumediene v. Bush, this Court held that prisoners at
Guantanamo, no less than any other person imprisoned by the government, are entitled
to invoke the writ of habeas corpus to seek their liberty . . . . Such judicial review, however, is only as meaningful as the procedures that are adopted to effectuate the Great
Writ . . . . [T]he District Court and the Court of Appeals have effectively gutted this
Court’s holding in Boumediene that habeas corpus is a fundamental right to which detainees in Guantanamo are entitled.”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011).
Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Rasul et al. at 9 n.5, Rasul
v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 06-5209).
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ties for judges to assess the overall fairness of imprisonment. That
foundation would seem to explain Justice Kennedy’s explicit confidence in lower courts working out the details of the habeas litigation
222
enabled by the Court’s decision. If the equitable understanding of
habeas relief best explains Boumediene, as a reading that emphasizes
meaningful judicial review would suggest, then further extension of
due process protections to Guantanamo detainees might be simply
unnecessary: judges would seem already sufficiently equipped to
provide relief by operating under the flexible authority of habeas review. But more consistent with this reading of Boumediene would be
an extension to Guantanamo of due process protections so as to facilitate judges’ exercise of their equitable discretion concerning detainees.
5. Boumediene as the Triumph of the Impracticable and Anomalous
Test
A fifth conception of Boumediene seems particularly persuasive and
is in accord with the understandings articulated by a number of scholarly commentators. This understanding embraces Falkoff and
Knowles’ notion of Boumediene as “the triumph of . . . the ‘impractica223
ble and anomalous’ test.” Therefore, in assessing whether the Due
Process Clause applies to detainees at Guantanamo, a court would ask
whether the Clause’s application would be impracticable and ano224
malous. This understanding of Boumediene connects with a conception of the general habeas-due process relationship as one in which
habeas provides remedies for violations of the substantive guarantees
of due process. Hence, as this reading of Boumediene suggests a
222

223

224

Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008) (“We do not address whether the President has authority to detain these petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and
other questions regarding the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”); id. at 798 (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not
address the content of the law that governs petitioners’ detention. That is a matter yet to
be determined.”). But see id. at 806 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The nature of the habeas
remedy the Court instructs lower courts to craft on remand, however, is far more unsettled than the process Congress provided in the DTA.”); Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1831 (2009) (“The indeterminate and unrealistic breadth
of the Court’s analysis [in Boumediene] thus comes with substantial perils.”).
Falkoff & Knowles, supra note 107, at 871. For a history of the “impracticable and anomalous” test and a critique of its application in Boumediene and elsewhere, see Christina
Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 973 (2009).
Cf. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the “impracticable and
anomalous” test to determine the applicability to the Northern Mariana Islands of the
Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection).
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pragmatic, clause-by-clause approach to the extraterritorial application of the Constitution that eschews overarching visions of constitutional operation in favor of case-specific and clause-specific analyses,
it thus anticipates that the applicability of due process must be
gauged on whether its recognition in a certain situation would be
impracticable and anomalous: and where recognition would not be
impracticable and anomalous, habeas provides the remedy needed to
effectuate the process that is due.
Operating under this reading of Boumediene, a court might well
conclude, in line with earlier applications of that test to Guantanamo
by the Second Circuit and by one D.C. district judge, that such application is neither impracticable nor anomalous and thus should be
recognized. Indeed, as the former detainees argued in Rasul,
“[r]ecognition of the right to habeas corpus, which, as the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Boumediene, may entail cost to the government and require compliance with judicial process, is far more impracticable than recognition of the right at issue here,” namely a due
225
process-based prohibition on torture.
If Boumediene in fact makes
the “impracticable and anomalous” test the basis for all assessments
of the applicability of constitutional provisions abroad for citizens
and aliens alike, then the Due Process Clause is likely to extend to de226
tainees at Guantanamo —not just because courts have come out that
way before, but because the very operation of the Suspension Clause
at Guantanamo seems to suggest the general practicability of extending constitutional protections there.
B. The Most Likely Candidates: Separation of Powers and the “Impracticable
and Anomalous” Test
The understandings of Boumediene most likely to be vindicated in
future case law are the second and fifth discussed above: the separation-of-powers perspective that affirms the engaged role of the judiciary in overseeing detention, and the understanding that heralds the
triumph of the “impracticable and anomalous” test. The former is a

225

226

Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross-Appellees Rasul et al. at 10, Rasul,
563 F.3d 527 (No. 06-5209); see also Ahmed, supra note 24, at 32–34 (arguing that the
practical concerns of extending due process protections to Guantanamo detainees who
already possess habeas rights are minimal).
Cf. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2094 (“[C]itizens enjoy due process rights whether
their seizures and detentions occur at home or abroad and . . . aliens enjoy such rights
when seized or detained within the United States . . . . [W]e believe that Guantanamo Bay
is sufficiently similar, functionally, to American territory that at least fundamental constitutional rights extend to all who are held there.” (citation omitted)).
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structural theory of the Suspension Clause that regards it as a defense
of judicial turf; it is an understanding consistent with much of the
most crucial language in Boumediene, as well as with other manifestations of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence. The latter is an approach
grounded in a concern with providing remedies for violations of individual rights; it also coheres with key passages from Boumediene, as
well as with the inherently cautious, contextual nature of that decision as a whole.
Given that these readings of Boumediene appear most compelling,
it is worth directly comparing the differing implications of these two
readings for the potential applicability of the Due Process Clause to
Guantanamo. As mentioned above, if the separation-of-powers understanding of Boumediene is correct, then the same concern with defending the judiciary might not portend an accompanying extension
of the Due Process Clause to Guantanamo—though it is not entirely
clear based on Boumediene. If, by contrast, the “impracticable and
anomalous” test constitutes the proper understanding of Boumediene,
then the finding of constitutional applicability appears likely to be extended into the context of due process. In other words, the two most
cogent understandings of Boumediene are not as complementary as
they initially seem. Once one examines the underlying implications
of those two understandings for the relationship between habeas and
due process, one realizes that the apparent harmony between the two
readings of Boumediene masks a fundamental tension between their
implications for a crucial underlying constitutional issue.
Boumediene’s emphasis on upholding the separation of powers
would seem to point toward an understanding of the Court’s decision
that is Suspension Clause-specific and, in turn, that might not anticipate a recognition of due process rights for Guantanamo detainees.
Boumediene’s plethora of Suspension Clause-specific language could
square with the decision’s separation-of-powers focus through a recognition of the unique nature of habeas access for ensuring the active
involvement of the judiciary. First, habeas access can be distinguished from due process protections if one understands habeas as
providing jurisdiction and due process as offering grounds for substantive claims: once habeas-provided jurisdiction ensures that courts
227
are no longer shut out entirely by the political branches, then separations-of-powers concerns might well be satisfied. Second, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Boumediene spent pages on the multi-century
227

Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 802 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Habeas is most fundamentally
a procedural right, a mechanism for contesting the legality of executive detention.”).
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history of habeas corpus, its centrality to the Anglo-American legal
228
tradition, and the role of the judiciary within that tradition : while
recognizing due process protections certainly has become a fundamental exercise of American judicial power, there is no similarly long
and rich history suggesting its absolute centrality in the very nature of
229
our jurisprudential tradition.
Third, due process is not generally
concerned with structural issues of our constitutional system, such as
separation of powers, but instead is usually conceived as pertaining to
the rights of individuals; in turn, its application to Guantanamo detainees would not seem to fit entirely with Boumediene’s separation-ofpowers rationale or an implicit view of habeas review as a structural
guarantee.
Despite all of those reasons for thinking that a separation-ofpowers reading of Boumediene does not anticipate an extension of due
process protections to Guantanamo, Boumediene’s emphasis on
upholding the separation of powers among the three branches of
government could conceivably be seen as pointing toward an applicability of due process to Guantanamo. First, the idea of ensuring
that the political branches cannot operate free from the oversight of
the judiciary would suggest that due process guarantees should be afforded to those subject to detention: beyond the access to courts
provided by the application of the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo, the procedural guarantees associated with due process would
seem the most basic protections that courts might intervene to ensure. Second, upholding due process is often seen as the particular
province of the courts, meaning that due process provides a natural
basis on which the judiciary might exercise further authority after the
habeas authority already declared in Boumediene. Third, recognizing
the applicability of due process in ongoing civil suits might, in a
sense, provide a way for the courts to exercise retroactive review of
the activities that occurred at Guantanamo before Boumediene: that is,
to whatever extent the political branches believed themselves to be

228

229

See id. at 743 (majority opinion) (“Surviving accounts of the ratification debates provide
additional evidence that the Framers deemed the writ to be an essential mechanism in
the separation-of-powers scheme.”).
See id. at 785 (“Even if we were to assume that the CSRTs satisfy due process standards, it
would not end our inquiry. Habeas corpus is a collateral process that exists, in Justice
Holmes’ words, to ‘cu[t] through all forms and g[o] to the very tissue of the structure. It
comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although every
form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been more than an
empty shell.’ Even when the procedures authorizing detention are structurally sound,
the Suspension Clause remains applicable and the writ relevant.” (alterations in original)
(citations omitted)).
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operating free from the oversight of the judiciary, the judiciary could
now assess their behavior by allowing to be heard due process claims
based on pre-Boumediene detention practices. All three of these reasons for applying due process to Guantanamo would cohere with the
separation-of-powers logic that suffuses Justice Kennedy’s opinion for
the Court in Boumediene, as well as with a structural understanding of
habeas review as a mechanism for protecting the judiciary’s proper
sphere.
On the whole, while it remains unclear whether a separation-ofpowers understanding of Boumediene suggests the recognition of due
process protections for Guantanamo detainees and former detainees,
the uniqueness of habeas corpus in the American legal system would
seem to suggest that, from this structural perspective, due process
need not follow habeas access. In contrast, a conception of Boumediene as firmly entrenching the “impracticable and anomalous” test to
evaluate the applicability to aliens abroad of each constitutional provision does appear to suggest that due process guarantees will follow
the Suspension Clause’s reach to Guantanamo.
If the Suspension Clause’s application to Guantanamo was
deemed neither impracticable nor anomalous, then the Due Process
Clause would seem similarly situated. First, providing habeas review
to detainees who would otherwise have no access to federal courts
230
demanded significant costs and resources from the government,
whereas adding due process protections merely obliges the government to raise the bar for the detainees and perhaps to treat them rather more like pre-trial civilian detainees: it thus seems even less impracticable and anomalous. Second, the very fact that, in the context
of evaluating suppression motions, D.C. district judges already have
231
been applying what seem like due process protections would seem
to cut strongly against any argument that due process is impracticable
and anomalous in this context. Third, to the extent that recognizing
some form of due process is necessary to provide the substantive basis
on which habeas petitions can be evaluated, not recognizing due
process protections might actually be the more anomalous approach—especially given this reading’s underlying conception of the
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See id. at 769 (“[W]e recognize, as the Court did in Eisentrager, that there are costs to holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad. Habeas corpus proceedings may require expenditure of funds by the Government and may divert
the attention of military personnel from other pressing tasks. While we are sensitive to
these concerns, we do not find them dispositive. Compliance with any judicial process
requires some incremental expenditure of resources.”).
See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
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habeas-due process relationship as one in which habeas serves as a vital remedy for ensuring that due process protections, once recognized, are upheld.
There are, of course, ways to argue that recognizing due process
protections for Guantanamo detainees would, in fact, be impracticable and anomalous. Perhaps most persuasive would be an argument
based on the imperatives of intelligence-gathering in confronting
232
“the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age” : to the extent that diverging from what might otherwise be the practices required by due process could be necessary to gather intelligence and
prevent a catastrophic terrorist attack, then recognizing due process
protections might indeed be seen as both impracticable and anomalous. A second argument might echo and extend Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in Boumediene: if Hamdi suggested that an American citizen detained on American soil was entitled to an apparently limited
form of due process, then it could be seen as distinctly anomalous for
an alien held at Guantanamo to receive the full panoply of due
233
process protections. Third, it is conceivable that courts could find
the extension of due process to Guantanamo, at least in the context
of civil suits against the U.S. government, to be impracticable not in
the protections provided to detainees but in the demands that litigating such cases would impose: in other words, while it might not be
impracticable for the executive to abide by the guarantees of due
process in its treatment of detainees, it might nonetheless be impracticable for evidence to be gathered, discovery to proceed, and claims
to be sustained regarding potentially dozens if not hundreds of detainees who might be inclined to sue the U.S. government if such
causes of action were allowed to go forward. And, by way of comparison, a military appellate court has held that “extending equal protection guarantees to [alien unlawful enemy combatants] tried before
234
military commissions would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’”
These counter-arguments to a finding of due process’s applicability to Guantanamo are substantial, but they seem generally weaker
than arguments that permitting habeas relief at Guantanamo would
have been impracticable and anomalous—and the Supreme Court
clearly decided otherwise on that issue in Boumediene. In turn, and
especially given the apparent feasibility of district judges already acting as if certain due process protections applied when evaluating the
232
233
234

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 752.
Cf. id. at 812–13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
United States v. Hamdan, No. CMCR 09-002, 2011 WL 2923945, at *46 (C.M.R. June 24,
2011).
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admissibility of coerced statements, it seems likely that due process
would be found applicable to Guantanamo detainees if the “impracticable and anomalous” test provides the best understanding of Boumediene—unlike if the separation-of-powers understanding prevails, in
which case a recognition of due process appears less likely.
The opinion in Boumediene, when read in the context of the case
itself, appears susceptible to multiple, complementary readings. But,
once one digs deeper in order to explore those readings’ implications for the underlying issue of the relationship between habeas and
due process, tensions emerge, and the different readings of Boumediene suddenly begin to tug in opposite directions.
CONCLUSION
Before Boumediene, the relevant case law generally suggested that
the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections did not apply to
aliens at Guantanamo. The D.C. Circuit has made clear its understanding that, even after Boumediene extended the Suspension
Clause’s reach to such individuals, the Due Process Clause nonetheless still does not apply to aliens detained at Guantanamo. Other circuits have yet to tackle the issue. If and when they do (perhaps in civil suits against the government), or if and when the D.C. Circuit
revisits the issue en banc, or indeed if and when the Supreme Court
settles the matter, a different outcome may emerge.
If Boumediene was a habeas-specific decision protecting the access
to courts of those imprisoned, then the Due Process Clause probably
does not apply to detainees at Guantanamo. Alternatively, if Boumediene was really concerned with protecting separation-of-powers principles and affirming the role of the judiciary, then it seems possible
that the Due Process Clause might not share the Suspension Clause’s
reach to Guantanamo. In another alternative, if Boumediene was
grounded in ensuring the type of judicial relief dictated by global
norms, then it seems likely, but far from certain, that due process
rights would follow. In yet another possibility, if Boumediene is correctly understood as providing meaningful judicial review, then detainees
are likely to be deemed entitled to the protections of the Due Process
Clause. Finally, if Boumediene makes Reid v. Covert’s “impracticable
and anomalous” test the basis for all assessments of the applicability
of constitutional provisions abroad, then the Due Process Clause is
235
likely to apply to detainees at Guantanamo.

235

Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, should the issue reach the Supreme
Court, the decisive vote is likely to belong to Justice Kennedy, who revived the “impracticable and anomalous” test with his concurrence in
Verdugo and then saw it command a majority of the Court as the author of Boumediene: all four of the Justices who dissented in Boumediene remain on the Court and seem likely to oppose the Fifth
Amendment’s application at Guantanamo, while Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan seem likely to support its application there. All five of the understandings of Boumediene set out above
offer plausible characterizations of Justice Kennedy’s fundamental
logic in that decision and, in turn, plausible anticipations of his likely
approach to the applicability of the Due Process Clause at Guantanamo. The most probable candidates are the separation-of-powers
approach and the “impracticable and anomalous” test: the former is
an issue of consistent emphasis in Kennedy’s jurisprudence, while the
latter is a test that Kennedy personally revived and made the approach of a majority of the Court. If he adopts a separation-of-powers
perspective, then he might well find that the Due Process Clause does
not accompany the Suspension Clause, which can be seen as constitutionally unique in its protection of judicial involvement. If, however,
he applies the “impracticable and anomalous” test, then the Due
Process Clause is likely to follow the Suspension Clause to Guantanamo.
If and when this issue reaches the Supreme Court, it will carry
with it a broader, deeper constitutional question: what is the relationship between the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause?
Perhaps the D.C. Circuit will continue to explore that issue in light of
the circuit’s current understanding that the former applies to Guan236
tanamo while the latter does not.
Regardless of whether the D.C.
Circuit has weighed in on this underlying issue, the questions that it
raises—of what habeas review means in the absence of due process
and how the two sets of protections relate—will present to the Supreme Court a challenging and surprisingly underexplored puzzle
about how two vital sets of constitutional guarantees interact.
If the Court leans toward a structural understanding of Boumediene
as a separation-of-powers decision, then the Justices will have to grapple with the underlying implication that, in general, habeas is a structural guarantee while due process protects individuals’ liberties. If, in
contrast, the Court understands Boumediene as the triumph of the
“impracticable and anomalous” test for assessing constitutional rights
236

Cf. Omar v. McHugh, 646 F.3d 13, 18–20 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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abroad, then the Justices will have to consider the corresponding
suggestion that the emphasis of habeas review is the provision of remedies for violations of substantive guarantees emerging from the
Due Process Clause and other sources of affirmative protection for
individuals.
As the Supreme Court contemplates whether to leave Boumediene
as its last word on Guantanamo or to hear further legal challenges
237
mounted by detainees, one consideration for the Court should be
that any further decision would implicate the broader question of the
relationship between habeas corpus and due process. Perhaps, for
the Court, that is itself a reason for letting Boumediene stand as the
Court’s final, albeit confusing, word on Guantanamo, thus avoiding a
238
daunting and difficult issue.
Then again, perhaps the rare opportunity for the Supreme Court to tackle such a central and overlooked
constitutional puzzle should not be passed up.
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See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al-Madhwani v. Obama, No. 11-7020 (U.S. Oct. 24,
2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/alMadhwani.pdf (petitioning the Supreme Court to decide “[w]hether the Court of Appeals’ denial of due process protections to Guantánamo Bay detainees is inconsistent with
the law and the Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush”); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Al-Odah v. United States, No. 10-439 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Al-Odah-cert-petition-928-10.pdf (raising due process questions in the context of Guantanamo habeas petitions),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Awad v. Obama
No. 10-736 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/12/Awad-petition-11-30-10.pdf (same), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814
(2011). The Court seems likely to face continuing petitions from Guantanamo detainees,
given that detention at Guantanamo appears likely to continue for the foreseeable future.
See Charlie Savage, U.S. Prepares To Lift Ban on Guantanamo Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
2011, at A1 (“The Obama administration is preparing to increase the use of military
commissions to prosecute Guantanamo detainees, an acknowledgment that the prison in
Cuba remains open for business after Congress imposed steep new impediments to closing the facility.”).
See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (discussing the benefits of the Supreme Court declining
to decide broader substantive issues when cases can be resolved on narrower grounds).

